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THE EXPRESSIVE CAPACITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL PUNISHMENT:  THE 
LIMITS OF THE NATIONAL LAW 
ANALOGY AND THE POTENTIAL OF 




To date, scant attention has been paid to sentencing in international 
criminal law (ICL); indeed, in the historic practice of international criminal 
tribunals, “the sanction imposed often appears to be little more than an 
afterthought.”1  This is understandable, for ICL as a field remains in its 
infancy, but unfortunate, for punishment is the distinctive feature of criminal 
law, and sentencing the vehicle through which it pursues and expresses its 
objectives, both practical and moral.  The absence of an articulated ICL 
philosophy of or justification for punishment and the dearth of sentencing 
principles can be ascribed chiefly to two factors:  As a theoretical matter, the 
abhorrent nature of ICL violations and the catastrophic circumstances that 
serve as the principal catalyst for ICL’s development—the rupture, by war, 
national, religious or ethnic conflict, or otherwise, of basic social norms 
against brutal violence2—invite “intuitive-moralistic answers,” making debate 
about the rationales for punishing serious human rights atrocities seem 
pejoratively academic;3 as a practical matter, perhaps in part for that reason, 
the principal positive law instruments drafted to govern international trials of 
ICL violations say remarkably little about the purposes of punishment and 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I acknowledge with gratitude 
the helpful comments of Mahnoush Arsanjani, Anthony Colangelo, Michael Dorf, Brandon Garrett, 
Sasha Greenawalt, Paul Kahn, Hoi Kong, Tom Lee, Gerard E. Lynch, Thomas Pogge, W. Michael 
Reisman, James J. Silk, and Jeremy Waldron. 
1 William A. Schabas, International Sentencing: From Leipzig (1923) to Arusha (1996), in 3 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 171, 171 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter 
Schabas, International Sentencing]; see also José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: 
Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 408 (1999); Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a 
Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 418, 434 & n.81 
(2001). 
2  Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and 
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 501, 501 (1996) [hereinafter Akhavan, Politics and 
Pragmatics]. 
3 See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS 13 (2000); Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 561, 564 (2002). 
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include comparably laconic sentencing provisions.4  
Punishment, however, whether authorized by international or national 
law,5 requires justification; otherwise, it is simply cruelty.6  And sentencing 
practices, international no less than national, should reflect and foster the goals 
of punishment.  Yet in penal theory, as elsewhere, “the mechanical transfer of 
domestic criminal law principles to the international context . . . is fraught with 
dangers.”7  Justifications for punishment common to national systems of 
criminal law cannot be transplanted unreflectively to the distinct legal, moral, 
and institutional context of ICL.8  
Use of the national law analogy in diverse areas of international legal 
theory and practice boasts a long pedigree and an equally long and powerful 
history of criticism.9  But application of the national law analogy proves 
particularly problematic for ICL because it strives to combine the paradigms of 
two very different legal fields:  (1) classical international law—a profoundly 
consensual body of law based on broadly shareable norms among nation-states 
and occupied mainly with their rights and duties inter se; and (2) national 
criminal law—a profoundly coercive body of law often understood to embody 
the most fundamental norms and values of a local community, generally that of 
a single nation-state (or political subdivision).10  In particular, ICL differs from 
national criminal law in at least three significant ways that the national law 
analogy can obscure.  
 
4 RODNEY DIXON & KARIM KHAN, ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND 
EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 483 (2003); Mark Drumbl, Collective Violence and 
Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 551–52 (2005). See 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, art. 78, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (July 17, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter 
Rome Statute]; The Secretary-General, Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 48th Sess., Annex, art. 113, U.N. Doc. S/25704 
(May 3, 1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; S.C. Res. 955, art. 23, ¶2, U.N. 
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994) 
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
5 For clarity, I use the adjective “national,” rather than the semantically equivalent “municipal,” 
“internal,” or “domestic,” to refer to nation-states. 
6 Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 346 (1983); see also Coker 
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (describing punishment that does not contribute to any penal 
goal as “nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering”). 
7 Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 237, 
251 (1998). For two recent critiques of this “mechanical transfer,” see Drumbl, supra note 4; Tallgren, 
supra note 3; see also HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF 
EVIL 291–92 (1963) (“Can we apply the same principle that is applied to a governmental apparatus in 
which crime and violence are exceptions and borderline cases to a political order in which crime is 
legal and the rule?”). 
8 See BASS, supra note 3, at 13 (“The application of national law to war crimes is in many ways 
the legal equivalent of a bad analogy.”); see also Tallgren, supra note 3, at 565–66.  See generally 
Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution 
of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002) (critiquing the presumed merits of the 
criminal justice model from the perspective of sociology and collective psychology); Mark J. Osiel, 
Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 118 (2000) (surveying nine 
critiques of the viability or propriety of criminal justice as a means of responding to mass atrocities). 
9 E.g., Hedley Bull, Society and Anarchy in International Relations, in DIPLOMATIC 
INVESTIGATIONS 35 (Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wright eds., 1966); see, e.g., GEORGE KENNAN, 
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900–1950, at 95 (1951).  
10 Louise Arbour, Progress and Challenges in International Criminal Justice, 21 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 531, 531 (1997); see also Tallgren, supra note 3, at 562. 
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First, unlike national criminal law, ICL purports to serve multiple 
communities, including both literal ones—for example, ethnic or national 
communities—and the figurative “international community,” which, needless 
to say, is not monolithic; it consists of multiple, often competing, 
constituencies and interests.  ICL attempts to mediate between the divergent 
interests and goals of several bodies of law (national and international) 
promulgated by these overlapping, but far from identical, constituencies.  At 
sentencing, arrayed against these diverse communal interests and objectives is 
the convicted’s core liberty interest.  
Second, the national law analogy can obscure the collective character 
of ICL crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and 
aggression), a feature that distinguishes them from most similar crimes of 
violence in the national sphere.11  Arguably, the collective nature of the victim 
of international crimes—for example, a national, racial, or ethnic group—
aggravates the culpability of the perpetrator, just as the prejudicial motive and 
harm of a bias crime render an assault or murder, for example, more 
blameworthy because of secondary harms.12  At the same time, the collective 
nature of the perpetrator—his role and status relative to the nation-state, 
military organization, or other collective entity implicated by ICL crimes—
arguably mitigates culpability in some circumstances insofar as collectivity 
might be thought to diffuse moral responsibility, mitigating each perpetrator’s 
guilt in some proportion to that of the collective.13
Third, perpetrators of ICL crimes often act in a normative universe that 
differs dramatically from the relatively stable, well-ordered society that most 
national criminal justice systems take as their baseline.  ICL crimes typically 
occur during periods of war, ethnic conflict, or other societal breakdown 
characterized by the erosion, if not inversion, of basic social norms against 
violence, either generally or relative to certain demonized and dehumanized 
ethnic, political, religious, national, or racial groups.14 Conceptualizing war 
criminals and génocidaires as deviants from fundamental societal norms may 
make less sense where their criminal conduct, while deviant by reference to 
international norms and general principles of law common to civilized nations, 
nonetheless becomes in some sense normative within the criminal’s 
 
11 E.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT–94–1, Judgment, ¶ 191 (July 15, 1999) (“Most of the 
time [ICL] crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of single individuals but constitute 
manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes are often carried out by groups of individuals 
acting in pursuance of a common criminal design.”); see also Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, 
Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 
HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 781 (1998) [hereinafter Akhavan, Justice in the Hague]; George P. Fletcher, The 
Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 
1499, 1514 (2002).  For convenience, I will at times refer collectively to war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and aggression as “international crimes” or “ICL crimes.” 
12 Danner, supra note 1, at 466; see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1993) 
(accepting the argument that a bias-crime statute “singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct 
because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm,” for “bias-motivated 
crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, 
and incite community unrest”).
13 Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1512, 1538.  
14 W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human 
Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77 (1996). 
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community, be it national, ethnic, racial, or martial.15  
These observations do not necessarily impugn ICL’s coherence or 
viability as a criminal justice system, but they undoubtedly call for far greater 
attention to the features that distinguish it.  The process of adjudication, 
however, is an awkward stage at which to recognize and accommodate the 
salient distinctions.  Efforts to modify the ICL trial process itself would be 
likely to raise questions about fundamental fairness to the defendants and to 
conflict with due process standards guaranteed by international human rights 
law.  It would be ironic and counterproductive were ICL trials to undermine 
some international human rights standards in an effort to vindicate others.16  
Sentencing, by contrast, tends to be a far more flexible process; it can more 
readily be tailored to accommodate the factors relevant to appraising 
culpability in contexts that often differ dramatically from those presumed by 
national criminal justice systems. Many issues highlighted by critiques of the 
national law analogy might thereby be addressed without undermining the 
integrity and relative uniformity of international due process standards.  
This Article offers and defends an expressive account of punishment 
by international criminal tribunals, which aims to maximize its efficacy while 
responding to issues of justice, due process, and proportionality raised by a 
closer examination of the flaws in the analogy between national and 
international criminal justice.  I argue that the expressive dimensions of 
punishment best capture both the nature of international sentencing and its 
realistic institutional capacity to make a difference given the legal, political, 
and resource constraints that will continue, for the foreseeable future, to afflict 
international criminal tribunals.  Expressive accounts of punishment emphasize 
that incarceration and other forms of “hard treatment” do not impose suffering 
only, or even primarily, as a means to deter crime or to exact a debt owed by 
the criminal to society.  Rather,  
 
punishment is a conventional device for the expression of 
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of 
disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the 
punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the 
punishment is inflicted.  Punishment, in short, has a symbolic 
significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.17  
 
15 See ARENDT, supra note 7, at 294–95; Drumbl, supra note 4, at 549–50, 567–68; Mark Osiel, 
The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1755 & 
nn.13–15, 1769 (2005); Tallgren, supra note 3, at 573–75. 
16 See William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 461, 516 (1997) [hereinafter Schabas, A Human Rights Approach]; cf. Jan 
Christoph Nemitz & Steffen Wirth, Some Observations on the Law on Sentencing of the ICC, 13 INT’L 
CRIM. CT. MONITOR, Dec. 1999, at 13 (emphasizing that the International Criminal Court (ICC) “must 
not only pronounce . . . principles of legal conduct but must also itself serve as an example of such 
legal behaviour,” and that “[f]or this reason, a just and consistent sentencing practice is paramount: the 
slightest hint of bias, or suspicion that the Court might have passed an unjust or disproportionate 
judgment, could severely affect this . . . most important aim”).   
17 JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING 95, 98 
(1970); see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 599 
(1996) (“Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention that 
signifies moral condemnation.”). 
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ICL’s ability to contribute to the lofty objectives ascribed to it depends 
far more on enhancing its value as authoritative expression than on ill-fated 
efforts to identify the “right” punishment, whatever that could mean, for often 
unconscionable crimes.18
In Part I, while recognizing the force of the critique of the national law 
analogy, I offer some critiques of that critique and attempt to put it into 
perspective.  I emphasize that ICL must be conceived not as a panacea but as 
one element of what should be a more comprehensive strategy to prevent and 
address the circumstances that give rise to serious human rights atrocities.  I 
consider briefly some of the global challenges to ICL.  My principal concern, 
however, is not to appraise ICL’s value against other transitional justice 
mechanisms.  With the advent of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the 
proliferation of hybrid tribunals, and the increasing invocation of universal 
jurisdiction to try ICL crimes, I assume, at least for the purposes of this Article, 
that ICL has become a fixture of the international legal landscape that will 
continue to evolve rapidly.  My hope is to clarify more precisely the objectives 
that ICL might realistically further and to consider how greater attention to 
punishment—the distinctive feature of any system of criminal law—and its 
manifestation in the ICL sentencing process might enhance the ability of ICL 
to contribute to them.  
In Part II, I analyze three significant ways in which ICL differs from 
national criminal justice, focusing on the distinctive nature of the communities, 
crimes, and perpetrators implicated by ICL generally and international 
tribunals applying ICL in particular.  I argue that, at least for purposes of 
conceptualizing punishment and sentencing, these tribunals should not, 
contrary to the prevailing view, be conceived as institutions designed to 
dispense proxy justice—that is, as substitutes for national criminal justice 
systems disabled by a lack of political will or resources.  I also explore whether 
and to what extent the collective and psychological pathologies manifest in 
ICL crimes should bear on their punishment.  
In Part III, I briefly trace the transition in ICL penal jurisprudence 
from a relatively crude retributive impulse, exemplified by the post-World War 
II trials of the Axis war criminals, to the increasingly complex, but largely 
haphazard, approach manifest in the judgments of the ad hoc tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  The idea of applying the unwieldy machinery 
of a newly designed international criminal justice system to the Axis war 
criminals, which today strikes many as relatively uncontroversial, emerged as 
an alternative to the proposal, espoused by Winston Churchill and others, that 
they be summarily executed.  In part for that reason, the postwar architects of 
ICL gave little thought to the propriety or justification of ICL punishment.  
Until the recent proliferation of ICL, the product of post-Cold War human 
rights crises in the Balkans, Rwanda, East Timor, and elsewhere, it would have 
been impossible to speak of an ICL sentencing jurisprudence.19  Convicted war 
 
18 BASS, supra note 3, at 13 (“There is no such thing as appropriate punishment for the 
massacres at Srebrenica or Djakovica; only the depth of our legalist ideology makes it seem so.”).  
Bass also quotes a well-known letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers in which she remarks that 
“[i]t may well be essential to hang Göring, but it is totally inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast to 
all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems.”  Id. 
19 The absence of a sentencing jurisprudence does not necessarily distinguish ICL.  In the United 
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criminals, absent substantial mitigation, were killed.  By the 1990s, however, 
international human rights law, which embraces the rehabilitative ideal but at 
the same time insists on a “just deserts” concept of proportionality in 
sentencing, had evolved so as to render it intolerable to continue to sentence all 
convicted ICL criminals to death—particularly given the aspiration of the 
international human rights movement to abolish capital punishment altogether.  
The judgments of the ad hoc tribunals now offer some tentative guidance on 
sentencing, but the jurisprudence has not, by and large, grappled with the 
difficult moral, legal, and practical questions raised by the ways in which ICL 
differs profoundly from national criminal justice.  Resource constraints, which 
led the ad hoc tribunals to abandon distinct sentencing hearings at an early 
stage, also impeded the growth of a sentencing jurisprudence.   
In Part IV, I argue that the expressive capacity of punishment best 
accommodates the confluence of ICL and international human rights law.  I 
analyze the extent to which the standard justifications for punishment in 
national criminal law can or should be transposed to the distinct legal, moral, 
and institutional context of ICL.  Each conventional account of punishment 
offers some insights that should be integrated into a comprehensive account of 
ICL’s penal goals, but the highly distinct nature of ICL relative to national 
criminal justice compromises the coherence or efficacy (or both) of 
conventional crime control (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation) and 
retributive justifications for punishment.  The principal value of ICL 
punishment lies in its expressive dimensions, which more accurately capture 
the nature of international sentencing and ICL’s realistic institutional capacity 
to contribute to the ambitious objectives ascribed to it.  International criminal 
tribunals can contribute most effectively to world public order as self-
consciously expressive penal institutions:  publicly condemning acts deplored 
by international law, acting as an engine of jurisprudential development at the 
local level, and encouraging the legal and normative internalization of 
international human rights and humanitarian law.  At the same time, 
international human rights law requires that the deterrent or retributive goals to 
which a focus on the expressive capacity of punishment may contribute be 
tempered and constrained by considerations of due process, rehabilitation, 
proportionality, and justice.  
I conclude by briefly considering what practical guidance this account 
of ICL punishment offers for the substantive law and process of sentencing by 
international criminal tribunals.  In particular, it counsels first, the 
institutionalization of sentencing hearings as a vital component of ICL trials; 
second, greater attention to context and the role of the defendant vis-à-vis any 
implicated collective entities (states, armies, tribes, and so forth) as relevant 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances and a jurisprudence that distinguishes 
rank-and-file perpetrators from the architects and orchestrators of ICL crimes 
(and those on the spectrum between these poles); and finally, efforts to 
increase the level and quality of jurisprudential exchange between international 
and national criminal justice institutions—for the efficacy of international 
 
States, for example, until the latter half of the twentieth-century, it would have been difficult to speak 
of a federal sentencing jurisprudence. KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 23 (1993). 
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criminal tribunals ultimately depends on their ability to contribute to the 
development and enforcement of ICL “at the local level, where all of us live.”20  
I stress that ICL, properly conceived, means more than international 
criminal tribunals, the focus of this Article; it includes the synergistic efforts of 
national and hybrid courts applying ICL, experiments with universal 
jurisdiction, and transitional justice mechanisms including truth commissions 
and lustration.  I do not intend the account of ICL punishment and sentencing 
offered here as a universal answer to the sentencing issues faced by local and 
hybrid courts, some of which undoubtedly differ in degree and kind.  It may, 
however, provide guidance, for the international goals of ICL sentencing 
should always, in my judgment, be factored into determinations of just 
punishment for ICL crimes. 
 
I.  ICL IN PERSPECTIVE: EXPECTATIONS AND STRATEGIES 
 
Immi Tallgren rightly asks why “it generally seems to be taken for 
granted that whatever objectives and justifications work—or are supposed to 
work—on the national level should also, without any extra effort, cover the 
decisions and actions taken by states in concert.”21  Efforts to transpose general 
principles of criminal law common to many national legal systems to the 
substantially distinct moral, legal, and institutional setting of ICL may be 
misguided.  Part of the problem, however, which I want to emphasize at the 
outset, lies in the overzealousness of some proponents, which creates unduly 
high expectations about what ICL can or should manage to accomplish.  The 
ambitious goals ascribed to ICL include combating impunity, individuating 
guilt, promoting accountability, contributing to the reestablishment of 
international peace and security, deterring future atrocities, achieving 
retribution, creating an accurate historical record, and fostering both national 
and international reconciliation.22  But it should go without saying that ICL can 
only be expected to augment, not substitute for, other strategies—diplomatic, 
economic, military, and developmental—to address serious human rights 
crises.23  
Prospectively, international law must focus far more than it has in the 
past on developing and implementing prophylactic strategies to prevent large-
scale human rights atrocities in the first place.  Where those strategies fail, 
military intervention must, I believe, remain an option.24 Retrospectively, 
international law should certainly combat a culture of impunity for human 
rights violations.  But overemphasis on the ICL paradigm to the exclusion of 
 
20 Alvarez, supra note 1, at 483. 
21 Tallgren, supra note 3, at 565–66; see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 542–44, 566–67. 
22 See, e.g., Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 
1961 (2001); Nemitz & Wirth, supra note 16, at 13. 
23 Cf. Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 740 (“Nor is it befitting to 
subscribe to the judicial romanticism in some circles that views the ICTY as a panacea for all the ills 
of the former Yugoslavia.”).  
24 For thoughtful discussions, see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Human Rights as Politics, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 37–48 (2001); MICHAEL WALZER, The Politics of Rescue, in 
ARGUING ABOUT WAR 67–81 (2004). 
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alternative accountability mechanisms, such as lustration in the eastern 
European states of the former Soviet bloc or South Africa’s innovative Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, would be misguided and probably 
counterproductive.25  ICL remains only one tool, and by no means always the 
most appropriate or efficacious one, for addressing the diverse circumstances 
that give rise to large-scale human rights atrocities and violations of the laws of 
war.26  Even if international law now creates a duty to prosecute under some 
circumstances,27 it surely does not prohibit complementary mechanisms for 
confronting the daunting political, social, and legal issues that face states 
emerging from internal strife, civil war, genocide, repressive regimes, and 
other circumstances in which widespread ICL violations characteristically 
occur. 
Tragically, however, states historically fail to mobilize the political 
will to act to prevent or forestall mass atrocities until they reach horrific 
proportions—and often not even then.28  The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s military intervention in Kosovo represented an encouraging, if 
controversial, precedent.  Yet in retrospect, in the post-9/11 world and in view 
of the deplorable failure to take decisive action in Darfur, Kosovo appears to 
represent an exception enabled by a unique combination of circumstances 
rather than to herald a new era of multilateral interventions to prevent large-
scale human rights atrocities.  By contrast, since the end of the Cold War, 
states have shown both political will and enthusiasm for ICL prosecutions.  
With the advent of the ICC and the increasingly frequent invocation of 
universal jurisdiction by national courts,29 ICL will probably continue to evolve 
rapidly at both the national and international levels.  
We should continue to debate the merits (and demerits) of ICL as an 
international legal response to large-scale human rights atrocities, particularly 
because, insofar as undue attention to or reliance on ICL distracts from 
prophylactic strategies or excuses failures to take prompt action in the face of 
imminent crises, it emerges as no more than “cynical theater.”30  There is more 
than a little truth to the critique that international prosecutions in the wake of 
mass atrocities operate as a “fig leaf” to cloak and ameliorate the collective 
guilt of states and world leaders for their failure to intervene earlier or more 
 
25 See James J. Silk, International Criminal Justice and the Protection of Human Rights: The Rule 
of Law or the Hubris of Law? (Feb. 28, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(critiquing overemphasis on the prosecutorial model of international human rights protection). 
26 Reisman, supra note 14, at 79; see also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. S/2004/616* (Aug. 23, 2004) (emphasizing the need “to eschew one-size-fits-all formulas”). 
27 See Diane Orenlichter, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991); see also Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties 
Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty 
Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 182–91 (2001). 
28 See SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 
(2002) (documenting and analyzing the reasons for the persistent failure of the United States to act to 
prevent or forestall genocide). 
29 See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 1 (2003); Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Universal Jurisdiction: In Absentia 
Signaling Over Clearly Defined Crimes, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 537 (2005). 
30 Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 745. 
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decisively.31  ICL’s rapid development in the 1990s can be traced in part to the 
shameful failure of states to muster the collective political will to prevent or 
forestall systematic human rights atrocities, most notably in the Balkans and 
Rwanda.  This may account for some of the unrealistic expectations about its 
short-term potential to achieve objectives like the reconciliation of states torn 
by ethnic conflict or genocide, or the restoration of international peace and 
security in a region.  
But the origin of a practice neither defines its fixed purpose nor limits 
its potential utility.  And realistically, retrospective prosecutions may at times 
be the only international legal response practically available given the 
constraints of international politics.  In view of ICL’s resilience and 
development, we should, I think, acknowledge that for better or worse, states 
have made a decision to devote considerable resources—intellectual, 
economic, diplomatic, and otherwise—to establishing an international criminal 
justice system for war crimes and human rights atrocities, at the heart of which 
lies the nascent ICC.  Not as apologists but as realists, the relevant question 
then becomes not how ICL measures up against theoretically better or arguably 
more effective, but practically unavailable, international strategies, but rather, 
what goals can and should ICL realistically serve?  How can we increase its 
efficacy and legitimacy? 
We must also bear in mind that just as national criminal prosecutions 
represent only one component of a state’s overall policy to control crime, 
which may include, in addition, policing strategies, social programs, education, 
economic development, and so forth, so international criminal prosecutions 
should be—and should be expected to be—only one component of a broader 
strategy toward international human rights atrocities.  Tallgren, who offers a 
thoughtful critique of ICL based on flaws in the national law analogy, 
nonetheless recognizes that the critique itself relies on a somewhat unfair 
analogy:  “The ‘international criminal justice system’ is assumed to function 
following the mechanisms of an idealized national system that cannot be 
localized anywhere.”32
These qualifications aside, critiques of the analogy to national criminal 
justice raise many legitimate concerns.  Foremost among them are issues raised 
by the nature and priority of the diverse community interests implicated by 
ICL; the corporate character of ICL crimes; and the often dramatically distinct 
sociopolitical context in which violations of ICL characteristically occur. 
 
II.  AN APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL LAW ANALOGY 
 
A.  Nature of the Community: Proxy Justice, Global Stability, and Global 
Humanity 
 
Systems of criminal law presuppose their value to one or more 
 
31 Id. at 744–45 (discussing the skepticism and cynicism with which some greeted the 
establishment of the ICTY). 
32 Tallgren, supra note 3, at 566–67. 
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communities,33 in the case of a national criminal justice system, to the 
community of that state’s citizens.  The imprimatur of a community 
distinguishes the unauthorized infliction of suffering from lawful punishment.34  
Punishment, in turn, is justified by its value to a community. Theories of 
punishment necessarily invoke the interests and values of the community that 
prescribes it to justify, by reference to its consequences or some perceived 
moral imperative, the legally sanctioned infliction of suffering.  Deterrence, 
like incapacitation, seeks to protect the community from crime, whether by the 
same person or future putative criminals; rehabilitation strives to reform the 
criminal to promote his productive reintegration into the community; and 
retribution, unlike vengeance, is understood to vindicate certain communal 
norms and interests.  
Punishment in national legal systems, for all its complexity, can be 
appraised in terms of the objectives of a single community or polity.  Which 
communal interests ICL purports to serve is less clear.  At times, we speak of 
ICL in terms of interests and values comparable to those identified with 
national criminal justice—for example, the rights and retributive interests of 
literal victims defined, typically, by nationality, religion, or ethnicity.  In this 
regard, ICL emerges as a system of proxy justice for disenfranchised local 
communities victimized by widespread human rights atrocities.  At other 
times, we emphasize the interests and values of the figurative international 
community, either as a community of states or in terms of the more elusive, 
somewhat mystical, notion of a community of mankind, a civitas maxima.  To 
appraise punishment in the ICL context, we need to ask in the first place which 
community, literal or figurative, ICL should deem its principal referent, for the 
interests of different communities not infrequently conflict.35   
To cite one well-known example of the tensions this can introduce:  
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has struggled, with 
very limited success, to strike the proper balance between the interests of the 
states that established it through concerted international action—states that 
maintain strong commitments to emerging international human rights norms—
and the retributive penal interests of Rwanda and its nationals.  The latter 
objected vociferously, for example, to the Security Council’s decision not to 
 
33 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (Univ. of Chicago 
Press 2002) (1769) (stating that criminal law concerns “the whole community, considered as a 
community, in it’s [sic] social aggregate capacity”). 
34 In terms of Hart’s well-known enumeration of the elements of punishment, punishment “must 
be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence 
is committed.” H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 5 (1968); see also Greenawalt, supra note 6, 
at 343–46. 
35 See, e.g., Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the 
International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 385, 393 n.35 (2005) (citing a report by the Refugee 
Law Project of Makerere University, which criticizes referral of the crisis in northern Uganda to the 
ICC as undermining “the legitimacy of the ICC at the grassroots level” because of “the disjuncture 
between international conceptions of justice and local community traditions, values, and notions of 
justice”); cf. Osiel, supra note 15, at 1756 (“No one who attends transitional justice conferences in 
postconflict societies can long fail to notice the near total disconnect between the discourse of local 
participants, often focused on historically specific grievances about who did what horrible thing to 
whom, and of we more ‘cosmopolitan,’ peripatetic academic consultants, touting larger lessons drawn 
from other countries recently facing similar predicaments.”). 
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authorize capital punishment in the ICTR Statute,36 and to the ICTR’s decision, 
since retracted, to release Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a notorious génocidaire, 
because of the prosecution’s alleged violation of his due process rights.37  
Incidents like these highlight the not-infrequent tension between the interests 
of the figurative international community and those of the literal (local or 
national) communities that ICL also ostensibly serves.38  International penal 
interests may, and hopefully will, overlap to some degree with those of the 
affected local communities.  Still, instances of conflict, as in Rwanda, remain 
inevitable.39   
The prevailing paradigm for ICL conceives of it “as a means of filling 
in for national justice,”40 that is, as proxy justice pursued by international 
institutions and actors on behalf of local communities victimized by 
international crimes.  This view finds support in several comparatively recent 
developments in ICL.  For purposes of sentencing, for example, the statutes of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
ICTR include a renvoi to the national law and practice of the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively.41  Arguably, this implies a conception of 
the ad hoc tribunals as institutions designed to substitute for disabled national 
systems.  In fact, we know that the drafters included these references to the 
general practice of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda out of a conservative 
regard for the principle of legality, nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine 
lege.42  The ad hoc tribunals do not, in any event, consider themselves bound 
by the penal practices of these states.43   
A far more compelling argument for the proxy-justice model of 
 
36 The Statute of the ICTR limits punishment to imprisonment. ICTR Statute, supra note 4, art. 
23(1).  Rwandan law authorizes the death penalty.  Because the ICTR enjoys jurisdictional primacy 
over Rwandan courts, id., art. 8(2), and has sought to prosecute the most culpable offenders, as a 
practical matter, the leaders, orchestrators, and architects of the genocide will not face the death 
penalty, while rank-and-file perpetrators, who have been relegated to Rwanda’s local courts, will. This 
anomaly, among other factors, led Rwanda to vote against the Security Council resolution establishing 
the ICTR. See Akhavan, Politics and Pragmatics, supra note 2, at 507–08. 
37 Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Review or 
Reconsideration, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, ¶¶ 71, 74 (Mar. 31, 2000); Barayagwiza v Prosecutor, 
Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72 (Nov. 3, 1999).  For analysis, see William A. Schabas, Case Report: 
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (2000). 
38 See Jenia Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 25–26 
(2005). 
39 Surely, for example, survivors of a future genocide may find it difficult to understand why the 
Rome Statute not only excludes capital punishment but also generally limits terms of incarceration to 
thirty years. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 77. 
40 Ruti Teitel, Book Note, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 872, 874 (2004) (reviewing POST-CONFLICT 
JUSTICE (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002)); see also Steven Glickman, Victims’ Justice: Legitimizing 
the Sentencing Regime of the International Criminal Court, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 229, 257 
(2004) (describing the ICC’s purpose as “to supplant (at least temporarily) defunct domestic criminal 
justice systems”). 
41 ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 24(1) (instructing trial chambers to consider “the general 
practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia”); ICTR Statute, supra note 
4, art. 23(1) (instructing the trial chambers to “have recourse to the general practice regarding prison 
sentences in the courts of Rwanda”). 
42 Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 468–69, 482. 
43 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment ¶ 40 (Nov. 29, 
1996); see also Stuart Beresford, Unshackling the Paper Tiger—The Sentencing Practices of the Ad 
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 1 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 
33, 48–49 (2001).
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international criminal tribunals proceeds from the lauded principle of 
complementarity.  To many, this principle, which conditions the admissibility 
of a case brought to the ICC on the characterization of the relevant state as 
“unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution,”44 
implies that the ICC acts as a substitute for national criminal justice systems 
disabled by a lack of political will or resources.  In a technical sense, this may 
be true,45 but it is also misleading.  For a number of closely related reasons, 
international criminal tribunals do not, and as a practical matter, probably 
cannot offer proxy justice to the victims of serious human rights atrocities.46  
Given their limited resources, international tribunals will never be able 
to prosecute more than a tiny fraction of the perpetrators of crimes that 
implicate hundreds, if not thousands.47  The subset selected for prosecution has 
historically been, and will inevitably remain, contingent on discretionary 
political decisions made by international rather than local officials.48  Of 
course, international lawyers increasingly agree that both practical and moral 
reasons counsel a strong, if not exclusive, focus on the leaders, orchestrators, 
and architects with the greatest responsibility for the crimes rather than the 
rank and file;49 in a recent policy statement, the Prosecutor of the ICC 
expressly adopted this strategy.50  But it will not always conform to the 
priorities of the victims, many of whom would naturally want to see the direct 
perpetrators of crimes affecting them or their kin punished.  Their penal 
interests, understandably, will likely be more emotively retributive than those 
of a figurative international community invested in more abstract, long-term 
 
44 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 17.  See Ruth B. Phillips, The International Criminal Court 
Statute: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 10 CRIM. L.F. 61, 77 (1999). 
45 But see Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 35, at 391–97 (observing that the first investigation 
by the Prosecutor of the ICC arose from a voluntary referral by the implicated state, Uganda, even 
though its courts cannot, at least in the sense intended by the drafters of the Rome Statute, be 
characterized as “unwilling or unable genuinely” to investigate and prosecute crimes arising out of the 
conflict between the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army). 
46 See Alvarez, supra note 1, at 403. 
47 The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004); Akhavan, 
Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 775. 
48 See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS 30–31, 38–40 (1998); Diane 
Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 116 (2002).  
The highly political nature of ICL prosecutions—that only some serious international atrocities (and 
only some of the perpetrators of those atrocities) have been or will be prosecuted because of the 
realities of international power and politics—is a valid objection as far as it goes to the international 
criminal justice system as a whole.  See id. at 116 (“A random confluence of political concerns 
produced ad hoc tribunals for just two out of a number of conflicts that warranted such treatment.”); 
see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 581.  But given that the system exists, efforts to bring greater 
coherence, justice, and due process to its operation remain valuable nonetheless, and in the long term, 
may render the political selectivity of the system less tolerable to its constituents.  I am grateful to 
Thomas Pogge for an enlightening exchange on this issue. 
49 E.g., U.N. General Assembly Official Records [GAOR], Second Annual Report of the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 
¶ 31, U.N. Doc. A/50/365, S/1995/728 (Aug. 23, 1995); Carla Del Ponte, Prosecuting the Individuals 
Bearing the Highest Level of Responsibility, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 516 (2004). But see Alvarez, supra 
note 1, at 458 (challenging the assumption that elites necessarily deserve more severe punishments 
than low-level perpetrators directly responsible for crimes of brutal violence). 
50 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor 
7 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf 
[hereinafter Policy Paper]. 
2007 The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment 51 
 
                                                
goals:  ending the culture of impunity for human rights violators, contributing 
to the reestablishment of international peace and security, promoting the global 
rule of law, and so forth.51  Experience with the ad hoc tribunals also 
consistently shows that local communities implicated by their work perceive 
them as distant, foreign, alien, and often illegitimate.52  
Steps can and should be taken to improve the responsiveness of 
international tribunals to local needs and priorities.  Trials, for example, might 
be held, where possible, in the state where the atrocities took place.53  At their 
core, however, the problems identified above can only be reduced, not 
eliminated.  They inhere in the nature and constitution of international criminal 
tribunals, with judicial and prosecutorial personnel, structures, statutes, and 
mandates established by states acting in diplomatic fora rather than by national 
leaders acting in national fora.  With respect to the ICC, for example, its 
Prosecutor and judges, directly,54 and the assembly of states parties, 
architecturally, not any particular local community, determine the priority and 
propriety of bringing particular cases.55  These actors will exercise their 
discretion with foremost reference to the international interests they 
represent.56  The ICC may be able to bolster local efforts at national justice and 
improve its solicitude for the victims, but it neither can nor should radically 
restructure itself in response to the highly divergent local circumstances and 
legal, political, and social cultures implicated by each situation referred to it.57
 
51 Alvarez, supra note 1, at 406 & n.207, 454 n.450; see also José E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: 
Lessons of the Tadić Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2092 (1998) (“Some might contend that 
victims and survivors would derive more satisfaction from participation in trials leading to convictions 
of their actual torturers and rapists; that both groups might find greater catharsis from seeing such 
persons in the dock than from seeing their commanders—usually strangers to those victimized—who 
gave impersonal orders or encouraged such crimes generally.”). 
52 Turner, supra note 38, at 24–25. 
53 The seat of the ICC is in The Hague, but trials may be held elsewhere by agreement. Rome 
Statute, supra note 4, art. 3. 
54 See Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 17–19. Note, in particular, that the Court may, in its 
discretion, find a case inadmissible on the ground that it “is not of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court.”  Id. art. 17(d). 
55 The priorities of these actors cannot, of course, be equated simply with any monolithic 
international community.  Because the ICC will frequently operate “in the midst of the conflict” rather 
than “after the acute and violent situation in which the alleged crimes occurred has been resolved by 
military victory or political settlement,” Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 35, at 385 (emphasis 
added), it may well generate conflict both within different sectors of the international community (for 
example, between political and judicial priorities), as well as between the international community and 
implicated local communities. 
56 In the context of Rwanda, for example, the existence of the ICTR has undoubtedly privileged 
international goals “over the desires of many of those who have been most immediately affected by 
the genocide.”  Alvarez, supra note 1, at 409–10.  The ICC does not enjoy the jurisdictional primacy 
criticized by Alvarez.  Yet once the Court takes jurisdiction of a case, it seems unrealistic to expect 
that the manifold international pressures on the Prosecutor and Court will not result in a similar 
pattern, for “international tribunals are accountable to, and respond most readily to, international 
lawyers’ jurisprudential and other agendas and only incidentally to the needs of victims of mass 
atrocity.”  Id. at 410.  I do not mean to suggest that the ICC, or any other international criminal 
tribunal, should neglect the interests of local communities harmed by the ICL violations, nor that the 
Prosecutor will not cooperate with national authorities both to accommodate (to some degree) the 
latter’s penal interests and to maximize the efficiency of international justice.  The Court has already 
worked with local authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the sites of the 
first two situations it decided to investigate.  See Hans-Peter Kaul, Construction Site for More Justice: 
The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 370 (2005). 
57 Hybrid courts, which employ a mixture of national and international or foreign laws, 
procedures, and personnel, are analytically distinct.  They serve to bolster—at the financial, legal, and 
52 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43:39 
 
                                                                                                                     
Complementarity recognizes (correctly, in my judgment) that national 
prosecutions, if genuine, feasible, and fair, more effectively serve the manifold 
goals ascribed to ICL than do international prosecutions.58  Principal 
responsibility for controlling, judging, and punishing the conduct of 
individuals during times of war and other serious widespread violence must 
remain in the first instance on the highly organized, and often well-disciplined, 
collective entities—states, armies, and their cognates—implicated.  ICL, in this 
regard, benefits from and indeed relies on the “dual positivization” of its legal 
norms.59  Despite the vilification of the state in ICL discourse, we should 
always bear in mind, as Michael Ignatieff emphasizes in the context of 
international human rights enforcement, that the best guarantor of compliance 
with the laws of war and other ICL norms is not international law and 
institutions; it is a functioning state.60   
But it does not follow that once an international tribunal assumes 
jurisdiction, it should conceive of itself or strive to function as a proxy for local 
interests.  As a matter of functional capacity, it is doubtful that it can; as a 
matter of democratic legitimacy, it is unclear how it could.  The avowed 
mission of international criminal tribunals, historically and today, is to 
prosecute “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole.”61  The drafters of the Rome Statute did not design the Court with a 
view to the satisfaction of local penal interests.  Nor is the Court intended to 
replicate the process to which a defendant would be subject under an able and 
willing system of national criminal law.  With regard to sentencing, the 
drafters deliberately omitted any reference to national penal law and practice in 
the interest of “equality of justice through a uniform penalties regime for all 
persons convicted by the Court.”62
International criminal tribunals, unlike national courts, derive their 
authority from the concerted action of states, acting either pursuant to 
multilateral treaties (the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German 
Major War Criminals (IMT) and the ICC) or under the authority of Chapter 
 
normative levels—the capacity and legitimacy of national courts, but they do not function as 
institutions structured principally to serve international penal interests.  See Laura A. Dickinson, The 
Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003). 
58 See Alvarez, supra note 1, at 459–62; see also Turner, supra note 38. 
59 See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1747 (2005) (“International law operates and can be enforced to a certain 
extent on its account and through its own institutions and agencies. But particularly in human rights 
law and humanitarian law, international covenants and conventions operate best when they are 
matched by parallel provisions of national constitutions and legislation.”) (quoting Gerald L. Neuman, 
Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1864 
(2003)). 
60 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, WHOSE UNIVERSAL VALUES? THE CRISIS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (1999). 
61 Rome Statute, supra note 4, pmbl. (emphasis added); see also id., art. 5(1); id., art. 1 (vesting 
the Court with jurisdiction over “the most serious crimes of international concern”) (emphasis added).  
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg characterized the Axis crimes not as offenses 
against a particular ethnic or national group (for example, the Jews or the French), but against the 
international community.  Similar pronouncements appeared in the Treaty of Versailles, which framed 
Kaiser Wilhelm II’s indictment in terms of the deliberately ambiguous rubric of “a supreme offence 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”  Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and 
Associated Powers and Germany, art. 227, June 28, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 188, 285. 
62 Rolf Einar Fife, Article 77: Applicable Penalties, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 985, 986 (Otto Triffterer ed. 1999). 
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VII of the U.N. Charter, itself a multilateral treaty (the ad hoc tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda).  The Hobbesian notion of an implicit social 
contract—whereby individuals surrender certain rights to the state, which then 
gets a monopoly on legitimate coercion, in exchange for a measure of 
security—is strained in this context.  And the concept of an international 
community is notoriously problematic and ambiguous.  Unlike national 
communities, comprised of persons bound together by, at a minimum, 
territory, and, more often than not, by features such as values, language, 
culture, laws, history, and social norms, the international community defies a 
monolithic definition.  Often, it functions as no more than a convenient 
shorthand for a broad array of global actors (including but not limited to 
states), processes, values, and interests.63  
To develop a fair, principled, and consistent regime for international 
sentencing, however, we should nonetheless take seriously the project of 
identifying penal interests that reflect what we generally mean by an 
international community in the ICL context.  A crime may be “of concern to 
the international community as a whole” because it threatens either state 
interests (the focus of traditional, Westphalian international law) or certain 
paramount values of mankind (a concept redolent of natural law and identified 
with the modern international human rights movement).  To say that 
international criminal tribunals punish “the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole” implies the latter meaning.  The 
former, by contrast, generally calls to mind “transnational” crimes that can 
more effectively be investigated, prevented, or prosecuted through 
international regimes of cooperation, including treaties proscribing certain 
substantive conduct and extradition and other treaties facilitating procedural 
cooperation.64
In fact, ICL implicates both the shared values of humanity and the 
shared interests of states to varying degrees.  Aggression, for example, leaving 
 
63 E.g., Dickinson, supra note 57, at 303 (emphasizing that “there is never one, monolithic 
international community,” but rather “multiple international constituencies: communities of nation-
states (such as UN members, Security Council members, NATO countries, the Council of Europe, and 
the Organization of American States), communities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (such 
as human rights NGOs, humanitarian NGOs, or development NGOs), or communities of other actors 
such as corporations, academics, and on and on”); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and 
Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 79 (2004) (noting that 
the “comfortable rhetoric” of an international community “disguises the fact that there is no unified 
‘world community’ with a simple and easily accessible opinion to be had for the asking,” but “only 
hundreds of societies, with diverse and conflicting national practices”). 
64 Examples include narcotics trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and 
interference with the mail or international submarine cables.  See, e.g., United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108–16 (2004), G.A. 
Res. 25, Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2001); International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10, 2000, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th 
Sess., 76th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000), 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000); International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/52/164 (Jan. 9, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 249 (1998); Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989); Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 
24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, 
24 Stat. 989, 11 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 2) 281.  Extradition treaties tend to be bilateral, 
though regional multilateral treaties exist.  E.g., European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, 
359 U.N.T.S. 273.
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aside the intractable debate about its definition for the moment,65 disrupts the 
peaceful and stable international order that the U.N. Charter regime strives to 
preserve, implicating the interests of the international community qua 
community of states.  It also poses a widespread threat to life and liberty, core 
values of humanity and universal human rights, implicating the interests of the 
international community qua community of mankind.  Equally, while 
widespread or systematic human rights violations that qualify as war crimes or 
crimes against humanity implicate primarily the international interests of 
mankind,66 since the establishment of the ICTY, it has been recognized in 
international law that violations of ICL on this scale also endanger the 
international interests of states to the extent that they rise to the level of a threat 
to international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the U.N. 
Charter.67  This, after all, was the authority invoked by the Security Council for 
the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.68  In short, to adapt Michael Walzer’s terminology, ICL violations 
may threaten both “global stability” and “global humanity.”69
Giving primacy to transnational penal interests will inevitably cause 
friction with certain local communities, as it has in the past, but from a moral, 
institutional, and legal perspective, it more accurately and appropriately 
captures the values that punishment by international tribunals can realistically 
 
65 The Rome Statute includes aggression as a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction subject to the 
significant provisos that it must be defined satisfactorily and the conditions for its prosecution 
specified.  Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 5(1)(d), 5(2).  A serious obstacle to defining aggression 
under international law is the uncertain relationship between the Security Council’s political role in 
determining the existence of a threat to international peace and security and a putative international 
criminal tribunal’s legal role in determining guilt for the initiation of aggressive war.  See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 290 (June 27) 
(Schwebel, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “while the Security Council is invested by the Charter 
with the authority to determine the existence of an act of aggression, it does not act as a court in 
making such a determination”; rather, “[i]t may arrive at a determination of aggression—or, as more 
often is the case, fail to arrive at a determination of aggression—for political rather than legal 
reasons”).
66 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, ¶¶ 19, 28 (Nov. 29, 1996). 
67 W. Michael Reisman, Haiti and the Validity of International Action, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 83 
& n.3 (1995). 
68 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 
1600 (1994) (establishing the ICTR); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. 
S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) (establishing the ICTY); cf. Note of the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (1992).  The assertion 
that widespread or systematic ICL violations can constitute a threat to international peace and security 
sufficient to justify action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, while 
subject to skepticism in some quarters, cf. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 27 (Oct. 2, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 32, 42 (1996) 
(rejecting jurisdictional challenge based on the argument “that the establishment of the International 
Tribunal had neither promoted, nor was capable of promoting, international peace, as the current 
situation in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates”), is not implausible. The collateral consequences of 
large-scale human rights atrocities include “cross-border violence, substantial refugees flows, serious 
regional instability, or appreciable harm to the nationals of another state.”  Michael J. Matheson, 
United Nations Governance of Post-Conflict Societies, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 83 (2001); see also 
Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 740.  Consider, for example, the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide, which led thousands of Hutu génocidaires-cum-refugees to seek sanctuary in the 
state then known as Zaire, ultimately precipitating the demise of the Mobutu regime and contributing 
to, if not causing, what has been characterized as a virtual world war in central Africa.  Is it 
coincidental that one of the first situations being investigated by the ICC is in the same state, now 
known as the Democratic Republic of Congo?  For a recent example, see Lydia Polgreen, Refugee 
Crisis Grows as Darfur War Crosses a Border, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at A1. 
69 WALZER, The Politics of Rescue, in ARGUING ABOUT WAR, supra note 24, at 74. 
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serve.  Just as national criminal law conceives of crime as an offense against 
the state as a collective, not against the individual members of that collective 
immediately harmed by it, so ICL may be conceived analogously as concerned 
principally with the penal interests and values of the international community 
as a collective, not local political and social orders.70  Rather than persist in the 
futile and impracticable effort to make genuinely international criminal 
tribunals mimic national courts by dispensing proxy justice, ICL should 
candidly acknowledge that these tribunals serve distinct goals and 
constituencies.  
To avert misunderstanding, I stress that the jurisdiction of international 
tribunals should, in my view, remain the exception; indeed, as the Prosecutor 
of the ICC noted in a recent policy statement, “the absence of trials by the ICC, 
as a consequence of the effective functioning of national systems, would be a 
major success.”71  Where the jurisdiction of an international tribunal properly 
lies, however, it is by reference principally to international penal interests that 
an internally consistent, just, and principled sentencing scheme can be 
developed.  The sentencing practices of the ICC cannot differ dramatically 
from case to case as a function of the national laws and practices of different 
affected states; they should not, that is, require the Court to impose disparate 
sentences for similar criminal conduct based on where the crimes took place or 
the nationalities of the victims.  Whatever may be said about disparity in ICL 
sentencing more generally, that kind of disparity would raise grave doubts 
about the ICC’s legitimacy.72  Complementarity suggests that where state 
authorities can and will genuinely investigate or prosecute, international penal 
interests dissipate; where they cannot or will not, those interests become 
paramount.  
In short, the authority and legitimacy of international criminal 
tribunals derive from and rely on international rather than local laws and 
values.  National criminal justice for ICL violations should remain the norm.  
Hybrid courts offer a valuable alternative in situations in which the political 
will, but not the capacity, to investigate and prosecute exists.73  But where an 
international tribunal assumes jurisdiction, international rather than local penal 
interests provide the more appropriate metric for evaluating the institution of 
 
70 Victims, in both national criminal law and ICL, may be, and ideally should be, beneficiaries of 
the criminal law. International tribunals should take steps to improve their solicitude for the victims 
and to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of local communities.  But criminal law, national and 
international alike, does not and should not function principally as a proxy for the victim’s desire for 
talionic vengeance.  This is not to suggest that ICL need not concern itself with the needs of victims; it 
is only to say that the failure of ICL tribunals to respond perfectly to the desires of the community 
victimized by ICL and the related tensions that inevitably result do not condemn the enterprise. 
71 Policy Paper, supra note 50, at 4. 
72 See Danner, supra note 1, at 441–42 & n.105.  Disparity will almost certainly remain an issue 
in a different sense:  Under the ICC complementarity regime, whether a perpetrator faces national or 
international justice, and therefore the sentence to which he may be exposed, may depend on a 
variable unrelated to culpability, the ability and willingness of national authorities to prosecute.  But in 
that event, the penal interests at stake remain national in the first instance.  The perpetrator cannot 
complain if his sentence would have been lower under international law, any more than perpetrators of 
national crimes can justly complain that the sentence they would have received in another state with 
concurrent jurisdiction over the same crime would have been less severe. 
73 See Dickinson, supra note 57, at 310.  But see Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 35, at 402 
(noting that the hybrid courts for Sierra Leone and Cambodia, which were to be funded by voluntary 
contributions, face severe funding problems that call into question the viability of this model). 
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punishment and developing an internally consistent, fair, and principled law of 
international sentencing. 
 
B.  Nature of the Crimes: Collectivity, Secondary Harms, and the Diffusion of 
Culpability 
 
The transnational nature of the interests implicated by ICL should 
guide consideration of the goals to which any effort to develop principles of 
international sentencing should be directed.  But the nature of the crimes and 
perpetrators—the moral circumstances in which they act and the collective 
character of the offenses—circumscribes the manner in which those goals can 
and should be pursued.  ICL crimes share a collective or corporate character 
that distinguishes them from the bulk of national crimes; they can accurately 
be described, in some sense, as “collective” crimes.74  To appreciate precisely 
how the collective nature of international crimes may bear on sentencing, 
however, we need to distinguish between several different senses, for they 
arguably cut in different directions vis-à-vis the primary sentencing metrics of 
harm and culpability.75  In particular, international crimes can be described as 
collective in at least three ways:  They may involve to varying degrees (1) 
collective perpetrators, (2) collective victims, and (3) a collective or corporate 
mens rea. 
 
1. Collective Perpetration 
 
George Fletcher offers a compelling argument to the effect that all 
international crimes necessarily involve a collective perpetrator,76 generally a 
state, army, or similar authority.  As a categorical claim, this view strikes me 
as mistaken.77  But improbable counterexamples aside, it is surely correct that 
in the vast majority of cases, international criminals act on behalf of or in 
furtherance of a collective criminal project:  waging aggressive war; destroying 
an ethnic, national, racial or religious group; carrying out a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population or systematically violating the 
 
74 Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 781; see also Osiel, supra note 15, at 1752 & 
n.4 (2005); Drumbl, supra note 4, at 571; Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 605. 
75 The Rome Statute says little about sentencing, see supra note 4, arts. 76–78, but broadly, it 
adopts harm (“gravity of the crime”) and culpability (“individual circumstances of the convicted 
person”) as the determinants of sentences. Id., at art. 78, ¶ 1. 
76 Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1514–25. 
77 In my view, to use Fletcher’s examples, a lone soldier, acting without the explicit or tacit 
approval of his superiors, who refuses quarter to enemy soldiers would be guilty of a war crime 
despite the absence of collective authorization, see id. at 1521; and a Sinophobe in Connecticut who 
kills the first two Chinese men he encounters, with intent to destroy the Chinese people at least in part, 
would be technically guilty of genocide despite the idiosyncratic nature of his crime in context.  Id. at 
1523.  The mens rea for genocide, unlike that for crimes against humanity, does not require knowledge 
of “a widespread or systematic attack.”  Cf. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71 
¶ 471 (July 15, 2004) (killing of a single individual with the requisite intent constitutes genocide).  
Equally, for war crimes (to use a current example), it seems clear that an American soldier in Iraq who 
tortures a prisoner at Abu Ghraib is guilty of a violation of the Geneva Conventions whether he acts as 
a “bad apple” or pursuant to an official policy promulgated at some level of the military or civilian 
hierarchy.  
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rights of protected persons under the Geneva Conventions.78  For sentencing 
purposes, it suffices to accept that collective perpetration is, if not an 
indispensable element of each ICL crime, an almost invariable feature of each 
in practice. 
 
2. Collective Victims  
 
The second collective aspect of international crimes concerns the 
nature of the victim.  With respect to some crimes, the collective nature of the 
victim is clear.  To qualify as a crime against humanity, for example, one or 
more enumerated bad acts must be directed “against any civilian population.”79  
Genocide, similarly, requires the specific “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such,”80 and the ad hoc 
tribunals have emphasized that “the victim is the group itself, not merely the 
individual,”81 indeed, that “[t]he individual is the personification of the 
group.”82  Waging aggressive war, too, plainly involves a collective victim, 
typically another polity.  
War crimes, however, present a more complex analysis.  The Geneva 
Conventions require that the culpable act be perpetrated against a member of 
one of the protected groups:  civilians, soldiers rendered hors de combat, or 
prisoners of war.83  Yet war crimes do not involve a group victim in the same 
sense as crimes against humanity and genocide; they do not necessarily visit 
secondary harms on members of the targeted group, whether a civilian 
population or a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.84  Rather, “[t]he 
protected person requirement is better seen as a limitation on jurisdiction than 
an element requiring any particular mens rea on the part of the defendant.”85  
As a practical matter, however, international tribunals have historically 
prosecuted systematic rather than isolated war crimes.  The Rome Statute 
strongly reinforces this trend, vesting the Court with jurisdiction over war 
crimes “in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a 
 
78 But see Danner, supra note 1, at 472 n.238 (stating that “war crimes may often be committed 
by soldiers acting on their own rather than according to a larger policy,” and that “the chapeau of the 
war crimes provisions in both Statutes [the ICTR and ICTY Statutes] require neither an illegal 
collective action nor an act targeted at someone because of his affiliation with a group”). 
79 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(1); see also ICTR Statute, supra note 4, art. 3; ICTY Statute, 
supra note 4, art. 5. 
80 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
81 Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14, ¶ 410 (May 16, 2003); accord Prosecutor v. 
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-I, Judgment, ¶ 60 (Dec. 6, 1999) (“[T]he victim of the crime of 
genocide is the group itself and not the individual alone.”). 
82 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, ¶ 948 (Dec. 3, 
2003). 
83 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 3114; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces 
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
84 See Glickman, supra note 40, at 245–46. 
85 Danner, supra note 1, at 472 n.238. 
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large-scale commission of such crimes.”86
 
3. Collective Mens Rea 
 
International crimes also characteristically involve a collective or 
corporate mental state, a consciousness of action on behalf of or in furtherance 
of a collective project.  Crimes against humanity require knowledge of a 
“widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”87  
Genocide, while theoretically a crime that can be perpetrated by a single 
person, as a practical matter almost always involves a shared specific “intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such.”88  Aggression (conceptually) and war crimes (characteristically) 
likewise involve consciousness of acting as part of a group—for example, a 
state, military unit or paramilitary organization—engaged in a common effort. 
Legal philosophers frequently invoke Rousseau’s distinction between 
two different sorts of collective action or intention:  statistical or aggregative, 
on the one hand, and communal or associative, on the other.89  “Collective 
action is communal,” Dworkin writes, “when it cannot be reduced just to some 
statistical function of individual action, when it presupposes a special, distinct, 
collective agency.  It is a matter of individuals acting together in a way that 
merges their separate actions into a further, unified, act that is together 
theirs.”90  International crimes implicate collective action and intention in this 
associative, communal, or corporate sense.  The collective mens rea of a 
genocidal mob cannot be equated with the sum total of each individual 
génocidaire’s mens rea.  Rather, it is a shared, associative mens rea, a 
consciousness of being part of a common project, of acting as a group.  
Equally, waging war, obviously, is not a mere matter of each soldier engaging 
in combat with the enemy; it involves highly disciplined coordination and a 
chain of command. 91
 
4. Implications for Sentencing  
 
These aspects of collectivity, which may be present to varying degrees 
depending on the nature of the crime and the circumstances, arguably pull in 
different directions with respect to culpability.  Consider first the collective 
nature of the victim.  Several scholars and jurists, as well as the characteristic 
rhetoric of international law, suggest that this feature aggravates culpability.  
Danner, for example, advocating a view expressed by Judge Cassese in his 
 
86 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(1). 
87 Id. art. 7(1). 
88 Genocide Convention, supra note 80, art. 2.  See Amann, supra note 48, at 93. 
89 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 19–20 (1996); Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1509–10 (citing JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranson ed., St. Martin’s Press 1968) (1762)). 
90 DWORKIN, supra note 89, at 20. 
91 Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1514–15. 
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separate opinion in the Tadić sentencing appeal,92 offers a compelling case for 
regarding, say, a murder committed as a crime against humanity or act of 
genocide as more serious than the same act committed as a war crime, all other 
factors bearing on culpability being held constant.  Genocide and crimes 
against humanity resemble bias crimes under national law and produce 
comparable secondary harms that render the same act more culpable.93  From 
this perspective, the collective nature of ICL crimes arguably enhances 
culpability. 
But the analogy to hate crimes, while offering important insights, 
seems incomplete.  A collective victim, a racial, national or ethnic group, for 
example, characterizes hate crimes.  But hate crimes do not necessarily evince 
collective perpetration or what might be termed the cloak of collective 
authority.  To commit them, that is, individuals need not be associated with or 
acting on behalf of some collective, state, or organizational policy or practice.94  
By contrast, for international crimes, the collective character and authority of 
the perpetrator, as well as the associated corporate mens rea, in addition to the 
collective nature of the victim, characterizes the culpable conduct.  These 
collective features of ICL crimes arguably diminish culpability insofar as they 
diffuse moral responsibility and counsel distributing “guilt among the parties 
to a criminal transaction,” mitigating each perpetrator’s guilt in some 
proportion to that of the collective.95
Again, however, the analysis remains incomplete, for these 
observations apply differently depending on the defendant’s status and role 
vis-à-vis the crimes, “the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”96  
On the one hand, the collective authority, power, and influence that enable 
military and civilian elites to orchestrate a genocide, to instigate a widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian population, or to order, tacitly encourage 
or simply tolerate (by failing to prevent or punish) war crimes seems to call for 
a more severe penalty.97  The participation, instigation, encouragement, or even 
 
92 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals (Jan. 26, 2000) 
(separate opinion of Cassese, J.). The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals has engendered a debate 
over whether, all other circumstances being held constant, a crime against humanity should be deemed 
more serious than war crime, or an act of genocide more serious than a crime against humanity.  
Compare, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22, ¶ 26  (Oct. 7, 1997) (McDonald and 
Vohrah, JJ., joint separate opinion) (invalidating Erdemović’s guilty plea in part because neither 
defense counsel nor the Trial Chamber “had explained to [him] that a crime against humanity is a 
more serious crime [than a war crime] and that if he had pleaded guilty to the alternative charge of a 
war crime he could expect a correspondingly lighter punishment”), and Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case 
No. ICTR-97-23-S, ¶ 14 (Sept. 4, 1998) (expressing “no doubt” that “violations of Article 3 common 
to the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocol II thereto . . . are considered as lesser 
crimes than genocide or crimes against humanity”), with Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra, ¶ 69 (“[T]here is 
in law no distinction between the seriousness of a crime against humanity and that of a war crime.”).  
The latter position has prevailed in the ICTY, though several jurists continue to dissent from it.  E.g., 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, July 21, 2000 (declaration of Vohrah, J.). 
93 Danner, supra note 1, at 465. 
94 Of course, they may: the Ku Klux Klan or a neo-Nazi group, for example. 
95 Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1538; see also id. at 1539 (arguing that, for example, “the guilt of 
the German nation as a whole [for the crimes of the Nazis] should mitigate the guilt of particular 
criminals like Eichmann, who is guilty to be sure, but guilty like so many others of a collective 
crime,” and that “[c]onsidering the guilt of the nation in the sentencing process would provide a 
concrete and practical way to recognize collective guilt in criminal trials”).  
96 Rome Statute, art. 78, ¶ 1. 
97 See Danner, supra note 1, at 470 n.228; see also Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1511–12 
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tacit approval of a military or civilian elite often causes more aggregate harm 
than the individual crimes, however deplorable, of a rank-and-file participant.  
The cloak of collective authority poses a heightened danger, and its 
manipulation and abuse by elites should be penalized accordingly.98  
Conversely, for rank-and-file participants, acting within a collective context 
and often within a formal command structure, the collective nature of the 
crimes arguably reduces their culpability.  To appreciate why, we need to 
consider not only the nature of the crimes but the sociopolitical context and 
psychology of the perpetrators. 
   
C.  Nature of the Perpetrators: Moral Agency in the “Maelstrom of Violence”  
  
1. The Plausibility of Moral Choice  
 
Collective crimes frequently evolve from collective pathologies. 
Reisman remarks that “many of the individuals who are directly responsible 
[for ICL crimes] operate within a cultural universe that inverts our morality 
and elevates their actions to the highest form of group, tribe, or national 
defense.  After years or generations of acculturation to these views, the 
perpetrators may not have had the moral choice that is central to our notion of 
criminal responsibility.”99  Tallgren argues to similar effect that “the offender 
is likely to belong to a collective, sharing group values, possibly the same 
nationalistic ideology.  In such a situation, the offender may be less likely to 
break the group values than the criminal norms.”100  Citing Hannah Arendt’s 
well-known reflections on the trial of Adolph Eichmann,101 Milgram’s famous 
experiment,102 and other research on the “criminological, psychological and 
sociological” characteristics of many ICL crimes and perpetrators,103 he 
contends that “[c]ontrary to most national criminality which is understood to 
constitute social deviation, acts addressed as international crimes can, in some 
 
(“Criminal organizations pose a heightened danger in their collective interdependence and reciprocal 
support, a danger that exceeds the aggregative threat of the individuals constituting a conspiracy.”). 
98 While it would be misguided to assert categorically that elites always deserve more 
punishment than subordinates, “the degree of responsibility generally increases as we draw further 
away from the man who uses the fatal instrument with his own hands and reach the higher levels of 
command.” Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 11, 237 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1968). The sentencing 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda recognizes this 
aggravating circumstance under the rubric of abuse of power, authority or trust. E.g., Prosecutor v. 
Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 44 (Sept. 4, 1998) (“Abuse of 
positions of authority or trust is generally considered an aggravating factor.”); Prosecutor v. Krstic, 
Case No. IT-98-33, ¶ 709 (Aug. 2, 2001) (emphasizing that “a person who abuses or wrongly 
exercises power deserves a harsher sentence than an individual acting on his or her own, for “[t]he 
consequences of a person’s acts are necessarily more serious if he is at the apex of a military or 
political hierarchy and uses his position to commit crimes”).
99 Reisman, supra note 14, at 77. 
100 Tallgren, supra note 3, at 573. 
101 ARENDT, supra note 7. 
102 See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974). 
103 Tallgren, supra note 3, at 571; see Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 606–17 
(comprehensively reviewing the psychological and other social science literature on the effect of 
collective action and social pressure on choice). 
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circumstances, be constituted in terms of conforming to a norm.”104
The collective pathology of international crimes must, in my view, be 
factored into any morally and pragmatically defensible account of their 
punishment.  But the assertion that many perpetrators of serious international 
crimes lack the kind of moral choice central to our ordinary conception of 
criminal responsibility may imply two very different objections:  first, from a 
deontological perspective, that to punish behavior predetermined strongly or 
even absolutely by circumstances beyond a person’s control is unjust; and 
second, from a utilitarian perspective, that such punishment is simply 
ineffective, for the person likely lacks the kind or degree of agency that makes 
the threat of sanctions an appreciable deterrent.  I consider the latter objection 
below in connection with the analysis of deterrent rationales for punishment in 
the ICL context.  Here, I want to explore the former objection.  
I doubt that it is accurate in any meaningful legal or moral sense to 
conceive of ICL as a body of “criminal law that could be obeyed only by 
exceptional individuals” or to assert that the typical perpetrator “could not have 
acted or could not have been required to act otherwise.”105  To say that a person 
“could not have acted otherwise” may mean either that (1) given a strong form 
of philosophical determinism, no one can act otherwise than as he does, that 
the very concept of moral responsibility is incoherent; or more modestly, (2) 
given certain legal and normative assumptions about the conditions for 
voluntary action that beget criminal responsibility, a particular criminal “could 
not have acted otherwise” because one or more of those conditions did not 
exist in the circumstances in which he acted; for example, he lacked the kind or 
degree of control over his muscles or mind that humans ordinarily possess (or 
believe they possess).106  
The former argument, that perpetrators of international crimes lack 
moral choice, that is to say, choice of a kind or to a degree sufficient to justify 
punishment, is a variant of a familiar reductio ad absurdum argument about 
determinism and responsibility, the “argument from causation,”107 which 
Michael Moore expresses succinctly in this syllogism:  
 
1. All human actions and choices are caused by factors beyond 
the actor’s control (the determinist premise). 
2. If an action or choice is caused by factors beyond the actor’s 
control, then that action or choice is morally excused (the 
moral version of the causal theory of excuse). 
3. If an action or choice is morally excused, then that action or 
choice should not be legally punishable (the theory of 
 
104 Tallgren, supra note 3, at 575 (footnote omitted); see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 549–50, 
567–68; cf. ARENDT, supra note 7, at 294–95 (observing that in some circumstances ICL demands 
“that human beings be capable of telling right from wrong even when all they have to guide them is 
their own judgment, which, moreover, happens to be completely at odds with what they must regard 
as the unanimous opinion of all those around them”).  
105 Drumbl, supra note 4, at 135; see also Tallgren, supra note 3, at 573. 
106 See HART, supra note 34, at 95–97 . 
107 See John L. Hill, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of Responsibility in the Law: 
A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2048–49 & n.16 (1988); see also Greenawalt, supra note 
6, at 348; Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1112–13 (1986). 
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punishment making moral culpability at least a necessary 
condition of legal liability). Therefore: 
4. No action and choices should be legally punishable (the 
conclusion of universal legal excuse).108
 
Few, however, really mean to challenge ICL’s legitimacy based on this 
syllogism.  While it is entirely coherent, which is not to say correct,109 it would 
impugn not only the moral basis of ICL (and, for that matter, our intuitions 
about national criminal law) but also many central precepts of civil law, such 
as the voluntarist assumptions of contract law and the principle of fault in tort 
law.  Perhaps the strong form of philosophical determinism is accurate, but no 
legal system can genuinely incorporate it and still function.110  No legal system 
operates on the assumption that no one can be held responsible for anything, 
that all conduct can ultimately be traced to some combination of hard-wired 
internal circumstances, themselves a product of either nature or nurture, and 
external circumstances—neither of which leaves room for a meaningful 
conception of moral choice.  The law operates in the realm of normative ethics, 
not metaethics.  
For this reason, it does not suffice to point to circumstances like war, 
nationalistic fervor, or interethnic violence and assert categorically that 
voluntary conduct sufficient to beget criminal responsibility under those 
circumstances is a fiction.  Perhaps extreme circumstances simply make it 
easier to recognize that moral choice is always a fiction; they differ in degree 
but not in kind.  This form of hard determinism, in the ICL context, also does 
not explain why the figurative compulsion created by circumstances of war, 
mass violence, collective psychology, and so forth should be qualitatively 
 
108 Moore, supra note 107, at 1113. 
109 Id. at 1143 (arguing that criminal responsibility can be reconciled with determinism by 
defining responsibility, as G.E. Moore did, to require only “the freedom (or power) to give effect to 
one’s own desires,” that “[o]ne’s choices, or willings . . . themselves be causes of actions,” but not 
“that such choices be uncaused” by extrinsic factors) (citing G.E. MOORE, ETHICS 84–95 (1912)). But 
see Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability, in LIBERTY 94, 116 n.1 (Henry Hardy ed. 2002) (1969) 
(criticizing a similar conception of freedom). The syllogism also relies on peculiarly modern 
sensibilities about free will, desert, and moral responsibility. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE 
GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 39 (Maudemarie Clark & Alan J. Swensen eds. & trans., 1998) (1887) 
(“The thought, now so cheap and apparently so natural, so unavoidable, a thought that has even had to 
serve as an explanation of how the feeling of justice came into being at all on earth—“the criminal has 
earned his punishment because he could have acted otherwise”—is in fact a sophisticated form of 
human judging and inferring that was attained extremely late; whoever shifts it to the beginning lays a 
hand on the psychology of older humanity in a particularly crude manner.”).  
110 See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74–75 (1968) (“The idea of 
free will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system, a statement of fact, but rather a value 
preference having very little to do with the metaphysics of determinism and free will. . . . Very simply, 
the law treats man’s conduct as autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to 
proceed as if it were.”); see also Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability, in LIBERTY, supra note 109, at 
122–23 (“I do not here wish to say that determinism is necessarily false, only that we neither speak 
nor think as if it could be true, and that it is difficult, and perhaps beyond our normal powers, to 
conceive what our picture of the world would be if we seriously believed it; so that to speak, as some 
theorists of history (and scientists with a philosophical bent) tend to do, as if one might (in life and not 
only in the study) accept the determinist hypothesis, and yet continue to think and speak much as we 
do at present, is to breed intellectual confusion.”).  A purely utilitarian criminal justice model can 
justify punishment without denying strict determinism, for “[w]hether or not human acts are 
completely determined by prior causes, punishment can be an efficacious prior cause.” Greenawalt, 
supra note 6, at 352–53. But few theorists (and even fewer laypersons) embrace such models, which 
remain subject to well-known objections. 
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more problematic for the concept of moral choice than any other causal factor, 
say, extreme socioeconomic deprivation.  Consider the “rotten social 
background” defense:  that a defendant’s economic and social background “so 
greatly determines his or her criminal behavior that we feel it unfair to punish 
the individual.”111  At the theoretical level, given the strong form of 
determinism, it is not clear that the excuse of duress, that the defendant had no 
choice but to act as he did because of physical coercion, really differs from the 
“rotten social background” defense, that the defendant had no choice but to act 
as he did because of overpowering hard-wired impulses attributable to his 
socioeconomic circumstances.  Both defenses assert that certain causes, 
whether a “gun to the head” or socioeconomic determinants, effectively 
deprive a person of the agency required for moral choice and criminal 
responsibility.  
The point here is not to take sides in this perennial philosophical 
debate; it is only to say that if we truly believe ICL punishment cannot be 
justified where war criminals and génocidaires “could not have acted 
otherwise,” that phrase must not be understood as a global claim about 
determinism but, more modestly, as an assertion that certain legal and 
normative assumptions we make about the conditions for voluntary action that 
beget criminal responsibility do not exist under the circumstances.  Yet the 
nature and scope of the objection have never been articulated.  The real task for 
international criminal lawyers involves working out what conditions vitiate 
moral or legal responsibility and why.112  Did the person act under duress, 
unusual provocation, fear, or diminished mental capacity?  If so, should those 
conditions exonerate or only mitigate punishment?  The question, in the words 
of the IMT, “whether moral choice was in fact possible,”113 must be considered 
against the backdrop of the general philosophical presumptions common to 
modern legal systems:  agency, moral responsibility, culpability, and so 
forth.114  This is not to suggest that the dramatically distinct circumstances 
characteristic of ICL violations and the collective character of the crimes 
should be disregarded; to the contrary, they compel serious attention.  But 
categorical assertions about the nature (or lack) of moral choice evade rather 
than offer guidance on the practical questions that international criminal 
tribunals must address:  to what extent such circumstances should be deemed 
exculpatory, aggravating, or mitigating. 
  
 
111 Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a 
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 249, 249 
(Jeffrie G. Murphy, ed., 3d ed. 1995); see also David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976).  
112 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 304–27 (1977) (analyzing the 
conditions of responsibility for war crimes); see also Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1543 (arguing that by 
“creating an orthodoxy of hate,” the state or society bears collective guilt, for it “deprives people of 
their second-order capacity to rein in their criminal impulses,” a factor that should in some 
circumstances mitigate individual guilt and therefore punishment). 
113 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals, 
Nuremberg, Sept. 30 & Oct. 1, 1946, Cmd. 6964, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172 (1947). 
114 Cf. GABRIEL TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY 55 (1912) (“The criminal, had he so wished, 
external or internal circumstances remaining the same, could have not committed his crime; he 
himself was aware of this possibility; therefore he is guilty of having committed it.”). 
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2. Beyond Caricatures 
  
Several competing visions of the perpetrators of ICL crimes 
predominate in the literature arguably relevant to these questions.  On one, 
rooted in the social, historical, and psychological studies referred to earlier, 
war criminals, génocidaires, and other participants in large-scale or systematic 
human rights atrocities emerge as automatons enslaved by a mob mentality, 
incited by ethnic, national, racial, or religious hatred, and so strongly 
predisposed to criminal conduct that it arguably makes little sense to regard 
them as moral agents accountable for their actions.  (I stress that in practice 
few defendants prosecuted by international tribunals resemble this caricature.) 
The Rwandan genocide, in which thousands of Hutus systematically 
slaughtered Tutsis with machetes and other rudimentary weapons offers an 
(arguably) compelling example of this view.115  Consider, too, the child soldiers 
enlisted by the Lord’s Resistance Army, the subject of the ICC’s first 
investigation:  Abducted as minors, compelled to kill and fight under duress, 
and socially and psychologically conditioned to commit acts of extraordinary 
brutality and violence,116 it surely makes little sense, from either a retributive or 
consequentialist perspective, to prosecute and incarcerate them.  Non-punitive 
rehabilitation would be both more appropriate and more effective. 
On another view, however, in tension with but paradoxically also 
closely related to the first, the prototypical war criminal or génocidaire 
emerges as Hannah Arendt’s Adolph Eichmann, the model of bureaucratic and 
calculating, but at the same time banal, evil.  While this vision, like the former, 
characterizes the perpetrator as “ordinary,” it elicits very different intuitions 
about the propriety of applying the criminal law paradigm.  The rank-and-file 
international criminal is not conceptualized as a mindless instrument of the 
architects of ICL crimes, inculcated with ethnic hatred and psychologically 
conditioned to act as he does, but rather as an ordinary person who consciously 
chooses, albeit in an aberrant sociopolitical context, to participate in knowingly 
horrendous acts, often for social, political, or economic gain.  This vision of 
the quintessential calculating bureaucrat, unlike the alternative one of the rank-
and-file perpetrator acting under the figurative compulsion of psychological, 
social, and political circumstances, offers a far more compelling moral case for 
applying the criminal law.  Civilian and military elites present yet another 
paradigm:  Far from being unable to act otherwise, they personify the cynical, 
deliberate, and calculated instigation of ICL crimes as a tool in the service of 
greed or power.  
None of these caricatures, of course, accurately portrays the nature of 
all war criminals and génocidaires or captures the tremendously complex 
constellation of factors that may lead persons to engage in unconscionable 
crimes.  It seems equally misguided to either denounce or condone the 
propriety of applying principles of national criminal law to ICL crimes on the 
basis of them.  What we need is greater sensitivity not only to the gravity of the 
crime, but to the individual circumstances of the defendant, in particular his 
 
115 See, e.g., GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 243 (1995). 
116 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STOLEN CHILDREN: ABDUCTION AND RECRUITMENT IN 
NORTHERN UGANDA (2003); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE SCARS OF DEATH (1997). 
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role and background.  ICL undoubtedly seeks to regulate and judge conduct in 
circumstances of war, ethnic violence, and other extreme conditions that differ 
radically from those prevailing in a well-ordered, peacetime society—
circumstances that arguably expose the tenuousness of common assumptions 
about moral choice, responsibility, and culpability.  To some degree, however, 
those assumptions underlie the criminal law generally; they do not, by 
themselves, constitute a global objection to ICL.  Rather, the radically different 
circumstances in which ICL violations typically occur affect how, not whether, 
these assumptions apply.  The extent to which the conventional rationales for 
punishment can or should be transposed to ICL depends on paying closer 
attention to the nature and circumstances of the violations, a process most 
effectively addressed not in the context of trial, where the determination of 
guilt or innocence rightly predominates, but at sentencing.  
 
III.  FROM RETRIBUTIVE ORIGINS TO AN EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE  
 
A.  Postwar Origins 
 
How well has ICL sentencing addressed these issues?  The historical 
record is poor.  ICL’s components, especially the laws of war, originated well 
before Nuremberg, and history offers several early examples of international 
efforts to prosecute war criminals and other perpetrators of what would now be 
defined as ICL crimes.117  But the discipline of ICL as a distinct legal field 
originated in the aftermath of World War II.  Regrettably, if understandably, 
the emotive atmosphere in which it developed did not conduce to sustained 
consideration of the goals of punishment and sentencing.  At the time, the very 
notion that the most culpable Axis leaders and war criminals, men like 
Göering, should be subjected to the unwieldy and costly processes of the law 
proved controversial.  Far from raising questions about the rationale for their 
punishment, international criminal trials emerged as an alternative to the 
proposal, espoused by Winston Churchill among others, that Axis leaders be 
summarily executed by firing squad. In the oft-quoted statement of Anthony 
Eden, then Britain’s Foreign Secretary, many felt that the Axis leadership’s 
“guilt was so black” that it fell “beyond the scope of any judicial process.”118  
While the American, French, and Soviet position in favor of the establishment 
of an international tribunal ultimately prevailed, no one questioned that the 
sentence for the major architects of the Axis crimes, absent very compelling 
mitigating factors, should be death.119  Customary international law at the time 
also prescribed capital punishment for war crimes.120   
The IMT Charter therefore authorized “death or such other punishment 
as shall be determined . . . to be just,”121 and the International Military Tribunal 
 
117 See BASS, supra note 3, at 5 (characterizing war crimes trials as “a fairly regular part of 
international politics” that emerged well before Nuremberg).  
118 TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 29 (1992). 
119 See Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 180–81. 
120 Id. at 171 n.2; see also HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR 264 (1993).  
121 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
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for the Far East (IMTFE) adopted this skeletal sentencing provision 
verbatim.122  The judgments of each paid scant attention to sentencing.  Neither 
held distinct sentencing hearings.123  Despite a few isolated statements 
justifying international punishment by reference to its presumed deterrent 
value,124 the principal impetus for punishment after World War II consisted of 
an emotive reaction to the sheer magnitude and unconscionability of the 
crimes.  Insofar as a coherent penal theory can be inferred from the postwar 
trials, it seems to be a crude retributivism,125 notwithstanding Justice Jackson’s 
famous remark in his opening statement before the IMT:  “That four great 
nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance 
and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one 
of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.”126
 
B.  International Human Rights: Abolitionism, Proportionality, and the 
International Rehabilitative Ideal  
 
In time, however, international human rights law evolved to aspire to 
abolish the death penalty, and more generally, to emphasize rehabilitation as 
the paramount goal of punishment.127  The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, for example, limits the application of the death penalty with a 
view to its ultimate abolition and describes “reformation and social 
rehabilitation” as “the essential aim” of incarceration.128  Indeed, a number of 
European states regard life imprisonment as “cruel, inhuman or degrading 
punishment” contrary to modern human rights norms.129  These developments, 
of course, sit uneasily with the sentencing practices of the postwar tribunals.  
International law also embraces proportionality in sentencing as a general 
principle of law.  Contemporary international criminal tribunals must develop 
some principled way to distinguish between crimes that, in their sheer 
 
art. 27, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.  
122 Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 16, Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1589. 
123 Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 461 & n.2 (1997). 
124 See Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 173–74. 
125 Daniel B. Pickard, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 20 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, 129–39 (1997); Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, 
at 189; Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 500–01. 
126 TAYLOR, supra note 118, at 167. 
127 Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 464, 503; see generally WILLIAM A. 
SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2002). 
128 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 6(2), 6(5)–
(6), 10(3), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 44/128, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. 
A/44/49 (1989); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 4(2)–(5), 5(6), 1114 
U.N.T.S. 123; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, art. 58, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF/611 (1957), Annex 1, E.S.C. Res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/3048, 
amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977); 
Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, April 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114.
129 Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 176–77 & n.49; Schabas, A Human Rights 
Approach, supra note 16, at 480, 509.  
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magnitude and brutality, all seem to demand severe punishment.130  Surely, 
Duško Tadić, notwithstanding a conviction for crimes against humanity and 
war crimes that included horrific acts of murder and torture, should not be 
deemed as culpable or sentenced as severely as Jean Kambanda, the former 
interim prime minister of Rwanda and a principal architect of the genocide.  
But it is unclear what factors should be considered to arrive at an appropriate 
sentence for each—or for those defendants that do not fall clearly into the polar 
categories of “big fish” and “small fry.” 
International human rights law thus renders the retributivist impulse 
for ICL punishment, as manifested in the post-World War II trials, 
conceptually and practically problematic.  It is difficult to conceive of a 
punishment other than death that could fit most serious ICL crimes in a talionic 
sense.  Yet authorizing capital punishment in constitutive ICL instruments 
would undermine international efforts to abolish it categorically.  More 
generally, it is far from clear that terms of incarceration imposed by 
international tribunals can, even assuming they should, rehabilitate serious war 
criminals and génocidaires.  Until recently, few ICL judgments even 
mentioned rehabilitation as a sentencing objective;131 some explicitly 
discounted its value or propriety.132  The sentencing judgments of the ad hoc 
tribunals refer variously, and without much elaboration or consistency, to 
retribution and deterrence as the twin goals of sentencing.133  
 
C.  The Beginnings of an ICL Sentencing Jurisprudence  
  
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes represent only a slight improvement over 
their predecessor instruments in this regard.  Each contains a skeletal provision 
vesting the tribunals with discretion to impose a term of imprisonment based 
on “such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances 
of the convicted person”; a renvoi to the national practice of the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively; and a provision for restitution.134  The 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence developed by the tribunals augment this 
minimal framework, but only in abstract terms, providing for consideration of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, without specifying which factors 
might qualify.135  The jurisprudence of the tribunals has gone some way toward 
 
130 Prosecutor v. Blaskíc, Case No. IT-95-14, ¶ 796 (Mar. 3, 2000), (recognizing proportionality 
as a general principle of law); see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Sentence, ¶ 40 
(Oct. 2, 1998); Danner, supra note 1, at 450 & nn.127–28. In Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-
96-13-A, (Nov. 16, 2001), the Appeals Chamber rejected the argument that the defendant’s life 
sentence should be reduced because an (arguably) similarly situated defendant, Serushago, had 
received only fifteen years’ imprisonment. The court concluded that despite “superficial similarities,” 
Musema’s case, unlike Serushago’s, did not present “exceptional circumstances in mitigation,” and 
“[c]onsequently, the circumstances of the two cases are not so similar to justify a claim that the Trial 
Chamber erred by imposing a disproportionate sentence in respect of Musema.” Id. ¶ 390. 
131 Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 190; Mark A. Drumbl & Kenneth S. 
Gallant, Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International Criminal Tribunals, 15 FED. SENT. R. 
140, 2002 WL 32121741, at *3 (Dec. 2002). 
132 E.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 844 (Feb. 22, 2001). 
133 Danner, supra note 1, at 444 & n.109. 
134 ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 24; ICTR Statute, supra note 4, art. 23. 
135 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 101; ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
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filling out these gaps.  Both the ICTY and ICTR have considered a variety of 
aggravating and mitigating factors, including, in the former category, 
“leadership (superior) position of the accused, terrorizing victims, sadism, 
cruelty and humiliation, espousal of ethnic and religious discrimination, and 
the number of victims”; and in the latter, “superior orders, necessity, duress, 
voluntary intoxication, automatism, insanity, and self-defense,” as well as 
“entry of a guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility, remorse, voluntary 
surrender to the tribunal(s), ‘substantial’ cooperation with the prosecutor, post-
conflict conduct, previous good character, benevolent attitude toward the 
victims, and age.”136  
These factors largely mirror those common to national legal systems.137  
Notably absent is any explicit consideration of the social, political or 
psychological circumstances characteristic of war and other large-scale 
violence; or of the collective nature of the crimes—factors which may, 
depending on the status of the accused, either aggravate or mitigate individual 
culpability.  In Prosecutor v. Krstic, the ICTY said that,  
 
[i]n determining the appropriate sentence, a distinction is to be 
made between the individuals who allowed themselves to be 
drawn into a maelstrom of violence, even reluctantly, and those 
who initiated or aggravated it and thereby more substantially 
contributed to the overall harm. Indeed, reluctant participation 
in the crimes may in some instances be considered as a 
mitigating circumstance.138  
 
That statement, however, stands virtually alone in the jurisprudence; the 
tribunals have implemented it, if at all, haphazardly.139
ICL sentencing has thus evolved from retributive origins at Nuremberg 
to an increasingly nuanced body of law that recognizes the complexity of 
punishment in the context of catastrophic violence or war, defying the simple 
classification of ICL violations as obviously calling for the death penalty.  At 
the same time, confusion about the justifications for punishment and its 
distribution among different kinds of defendants plagues the jurisprudence.140  
Furthermore, while the judgments of international criminal courts often 
 
Rule 101. The sole exception to this general lack of concrete guidance in the positive law is that both 
statutes specify superior orders as a mitigating factor. ICTY Statute, art. 7, ¶ 4; ICTR Statute, supra 
note 4, art. 6, ¶ 4. 
136 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 327–28 
(2003) (footnotes omitted); see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 561–66 (surveying aggravating and 
mitigating factors cited by international and hybrid criminal courts); Beresford, supra note 43, at 53–
82 (surveying penal jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia). 
137 Drumbl, supra note 4, at 565. 
138 See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 711 (Aug. 2, 2001). 
139 In Prosecutor v. Blaskíc, No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber (Mar. 3, 2000), the Trial Chamber 
observed:  “It appears that, independently of duress, the context in which the crimes were committed, 
namely the conflict, is usually taken into consideration in determining the sentence to be imposed. 
Such was the case in the Tadić, Celebici and Aleksovski cases. Though mentioned in these cases, this 
factor does not seem to have been decisive in fixing the sentence.” Id. ¶ 770.  
140 See Ralph Henham, The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing, 1 J. INT’L 
CRIM. J. 64, 65 (2003); see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 566. 
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describe the crimes as comparatively more severe than crimes of violence 
under national law, such as murder,141 the penalties imposed for them often 
seem incongruously lenient, at least by a retributive metric.142  The ICTR 
recently noted, for example, that rape, torture, and murder as crimes against 
humanity have been punished by average sentences of, respectively, between 
twelve and fifteen years, five and twelve years, and twelve and twenty years.143  
In short, the present state of the law on international sentencing resembles in a 
number of respects that of the indeterminate federal sentencing system 
critiqued by Judge Frankel in his famous polemic, Criminal Sentences: Law 
Without Order.144
 
IV.  LEGITIMACY, EFFICACY, AND THE EXPRESSIVE CAPACITY OF 
INTERNATIONAL PUNISHMENT 
 
Conventional justifications for punishment fall into two broad 
categories:  crime-control and retributivist theories.  The former includes 
deterrence, specific and general;145 incapacitation, which can be conceived as 
an extreme form of specific deterrence insofar as, if successful, it obviates any 
recidivism concerns;146 and rehabilitation.  The latter, retributivism or “just 
deserts,” though often conceived in Kantian terms, originated in theological 
conceptions of justice, and from an anthropological perspective, in the lex 
talionis common to many early legal systems. 
Given the diversity of transnational penal interests and the diversity of 
views about what counts as an appropriate justification for punishment,147 it 
 
141 Glickman, supra note 40, at 230; see also Danner, supra note 1, at 488. 
142 Glickman, supra note 40, at 247–48 & n.70. 
143 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 564 (May 15, 
2003). 
144 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973). 
145 Specific deterrence, punishment’s tendency to prevent the person punished from himself 
engaging in future criminal conduct, has rightly been marginalized in the sentencing jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals, for “the likelihood of persons convicted here ever again being faced with an 
opportunity to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or grave breaches is so remote 
as to render its consideration in this way unreasonable and unfair.”  Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. 
IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, ¶ 840 (Feb. 22, 2001). 
146 Incapacitation, an extreme form of specific deterrence, seems equally inapposite. With the 
exception, perhaps, of some future Napoleon, few war criminals seem to pose a real danger of 
recidivism requiring incapacitation.  By the time most orchestrators of serious human rights atrocities 
can be apprehended and prosecuted, they typically pose no future danger.  Some may nonetheless 
deserve a life sentence, but not because of concerns about future dangerousness were they released 
after a finite term.  On the other hand, indictment, investigation, and prosecution can disempower, 
discredit, and delegitimize tyrannical leaders, stigmatizing them as international fugitives, unable to 
travel freely, and at risk of having their assets frozen.  Developments in the Law: International 
Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1962 & n.31 (2001).  Milosevic’s indictment, for example, 
arguably contributed to his political demise.  Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International 
Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 9 (2001) [hereinafter Akhavan, 
Beyond Impunity].  The saga of Pinochet’s attempted prosecution by Spain under a theory of universal 
jurisdiction likewise seems to have lifted the veneer of political invulnerability that formerly 
prevented local efforts to bring him to justice.  This quasi-incapacitative goal, however, is a political 
tool that precedes the trial process; or, following Hart, it may be understood as one justification for the 
establishment of an international criminal justice system but not, I think, as a consideration relevant to 
the distribution of punishment, that is, to sentencing.  
147 See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4 (1955). 
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would be misguided and likely futile to offer a monolithic theory about the 
goals of international sentencing.148  Furthermore, particularly in the 
international context, it is important to bear in mind H.L.A. Hart’s insight that 
the “general justifying aim” for punishment need not be coterminous with the 
justification for its application or proper distribution in concrete cases:  the 
questions “why punish,” “who should be punished,” and “how much should 
they be punished” may be usefully distinguished.149  Most ICL scholarship 
addresses the former, logically antecedent, question:  Why establish an 
international criminal justice system?  But as we move from theory to practice, 
from the justification for an international system of punishment to the 
operationalization of that system, we confront, in the end, individuals rather 
than abstractions.  The rhetorical goals of international justice offer little 
guidance on whether the gravity of a defendant’s crimes and his individual 
circumstances call for a term of incarceration of five years, twenty-five years 
or life.  
Each conventional goal of punishment in national law offers insights, 
but analysis of the extent to which retributive and deterrence theories can or 
should be coherently transposed to the international context reveals that the 
primary value that international punishment can realistically serve consists in 
its expressive functions.150  An expressivist account of punishment best 
captures both the nature of international sentencing and its most promising 
institutional capacity to make a difference given the momentous political and 
resource constraints that international tribunals inevitably face, for ICL’s 
ability to contribute to crime-control and retributive goals ultimately depends 
in large part on its value, legitimacy, and persuasiveness as authoritative 
expression.  This conclusion counsels more attention to the sentencing process 
than international tribunals have historically paid. 
Expressivism is not or need not be, strictly speaking, a self-sufficient 
“justification” for punishment;151 it is a function and essential characteristic of 
punishment as a social institution.  Incarceration and other forms of “hard 
treatment” do not impose suffering only, or even primarily, as a means to deter 
crime or to exact a debt owed by the criminal to society.  Rather, “punishment 
is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and 
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part 
either of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the 
punishment is inflicted.  Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance 
 
148 Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 401 
(1958). 
149 Hart, supra note 34, at 3–5; see also Rawls, supra note 147, at 5 (proposing, in the context of 
penal theory, a distinction between “justifying a practice as a system of rules to be applied and 
enforced, and justifying a particular action which falls under those rules”).  But see JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 331 (1988) (arguing that “[w]hether an account of the 
General Justifying Aim of an institution generates any implications so far as distribution is concerned 
depends entirely on the character of the General Justifying Aim”).  
150 See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 95, 98; see also ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXPLANATIONS 370–74 (1981). 
151 See Kahan, supra note 17, at 601 (defending a view of expressivism that “demurs to the claim 
of analytical interdependence” but shows that, nonetheless, expressivism necessarily informs 
“plausible conceptions of deterrence and retributivism”). 
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largely missing from other kinds of penalties.”152  
As a descriptive matter, expressivism aptly captures the nature of ICL 
punishment and the characteristic tenor of the sentencing judgments of the ad 
hoc tribunals.153  By punishing the perpetrators of serious international crimes, 
to paraphrase Feinberg, the international community attempts authoritatively to 
disavow that conduct, to indicate symbolically its refusal to acquiesce in the 
crimes, to vindicate international human rights norms and the laws of war, and 
to absolve ethnic or national communities, as collectives, of guilt by punishing 
individual perpetrators.154  
As a normative matter, the expressive functions of punishment can be 
transposed to the distinct moral and institutional context of ICL without 
straining the coherence of the national law analogy, for expressivism self-
consciously focuses less on the immediate instrumental value of punishment—
as a tool of either retribution or deterrence on the rational actor model—and 
more on the long-term normative values served by any system of criminal law.  
It may well be quixotic to expect ICL to exert a significant deterrent effect on 
war criminals and génocidaires merely through its potential to increase the 
perceived costs of international crime.  It may well be morally problematic for 
international tribunals, which represent and serve the interests of a figurative 
international community, to regard themselves as agents of retribution on 
behalf of victims who often regard them as illegitimate or worse.  But 
international sentencing holds the potential effectively to fulfill the expressive 
function of punishment by conveying its distinctive symbolic significance.155  
And insofar as deterrent and retributive theories of punishment can be 
transposed to the ICL context notwithstanding flaws in the national law 
analogy, it is largely because of the expressive dimensions of punishment.  
 
A.  Deterrence 
 
1. The Benthamite Model 
 
Human rights activists, diplomats, scholars, prosecutors, jurists, and 
journalists alike frequently ascribe the recurrence of large-scale human 
atrocities to impunity,156 by which they generally mean the absence of criminal 
punishment.  Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch, 
argues that “[b]ehind much of the savagery of modern history lies impunity.  
Tyrants commit atrocities, including genocide, when they calculate they can 
 
152 FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 98; see also Hart, supra note 148, at 404–05; Kahan, supra note 
17, at 593 (“Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention 
that signifies moral condemnation.”). 
153 Amann, supra note 48, at 123 (noting that “[t]he judgments of ad hoc tribunals have retained 
an expressivist flavor”); Danner, supra note 1, at 490 & n.308 (collecting illustrative cases). 
154 See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 101–05. 
155 Adjudication, too, may serve expressivist values and objectives, but as emphasized at the 
outset, efforts to modify the ICL trial process itself would be both impracticable and unwise from a 
broader policy perspective.  See supra text accompanying note 16. 
156 See Danner, supra note 1, at 446 nn.115–17.  
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get away with them.”157  Writing in favor of the ICTY, Theodor Meron, now 
one of its judges, suggested that “[a]bandoning the tribunal now would have a 
negative impact on the behavior of the parties to the conflict . . . . On the 
ground, those committing war crimes would infer that regardless of their past 
or future violations they will not be held criminally accountable by the 
international community.”158  On this view, punishment deters because 
potential war criminals know and fear the consequence of the law, that is, the 
pain of incarceration, and act to avoid it.159
But in the first place, deterrence, so conceived, requires the credible 
and authoritative communication of a threatened sanction.  The figurative 
nature of the international community poses tremendous obstacles to this 
enterprise.  It is one thing for a criminal justice system clearly to communicate 
a threat within a literal community, for example, a state or political 
subdivision, where constituents speak the same language, share sources of 
information, witness, at least intermittently, the operation of the machinery of 
the criminal justice system (police, courts, etc.), and ideally have good reason 
to believe, as Holmes wrote, that the law will keep its promises.160  It is quite 
another for a culturally foreign and geographically distant tribunal, which lacks 
its own police force and enforces the law sporadically and inconsistently at 
best, to communicate a credible threat authoritatively, particularly where local 
norms, as Arendt and others have emphasized, may point strongly in the 
opposite direction. 
Second, if the rational-actor model of deterrence is suspect in the 
national context, it is exponentially so in the international, where war, large-
scale violence, and collective pathologies, as well as the institutional and 
resource limitations of ICL, can be expected to distort the viability of the 
familiar cost-benefit calculus on which that model depends.  It is doubtful that 
the average war criminal or génocidaire weighs the risk of prosecution, 
discounted by the likelihood of apprehension, against the perceived benefits of 
his crimes.  And even if he does, “it is not irrational to ignore the improbable 
prospect of punishment given the track record of international law thus far.”161  
Third, the collective nature of ICL crimes means that “group think,” 
 
157 Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001 150, at 
150. 
158 THEODOR MERON, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, in WAR CRIMES LAW 
COMES OF AGE, 187, 196 (1998).  Much of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals emphasizes the 
deterrent objective of punishment. E.g., Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, No. ICTR-96-3-T, ¶ 456 (Dec. 6, 
1999); Prosecutor v. Delalić, No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 1234 (Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, No. 
ICTR-97-23-S, ¶ 26 (Sept. 4, 1998). 
159 See Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 
(1985) 
160 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 806 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1953); see also OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 46–47 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881). 
161 MINOW, supra note 48, at 50; David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of 
International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 476–77 (1999) (“For most offenders, especially 
low-ranking offenders, the risk of prosecution must appear to be almost the equivalent of losing the 
war crimes prosecution lottery.”); see also Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 741; 
Alvarez, supra note 51, at 2079–80; Danner, supra note 1, at 439 & n.97; Tallgren, supra note 3, at 
570–76.  In fact, scant empirical evidence exists on the deterrent potential of ICL. Historical and 
anecdotal evidence is inconclusive at best.  See BASS, supra note 3, at 290–95; Fletcher & Weinstein, 
supra note 8, at 592; Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 463 
(1998); Wippman, supra, at 474–75. 
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undue obedience to authority, and other phenomena familiar from the social 
psychology research canvassed by Fletcher and Weinstein may well interfere 
with this kind of calculation.162  Bentham wrote that punishment cannot deter 
“[w]here the penal provision, though it were conveyed to a man’s notice, could 
produce no effect on him, with respect to preventing him from engaging in any 
act of the sort in question.”163  While he had in mind circumstances like 
infancy, insanity, and intoxication, the principle applies equally to any 
psychological or physical condition that negates or overrides the fear of penal 
sanctions.  The chaotic circumstances of war, large-scale violence, ethnic 
conflict, or genocide clearly qualify. 
We should avoid overstating these critiques.  They do not show that, 
for ICL, “deterrence doesn’t work.”164  In the first place, skepticism about 
deterrence is not unique to ICL.  Within nation-states, too, the evidence 
supporting general deterrence is inconclusive and difficult to interpret.165  Few 
believe that would-be war criminals will “read the resolutions of the Security 
Council and stop their grave violations of international humanitarian law” or 
“be indoctrinated to refrain from further breaches of the law and to support the 
shared values of the international community if one of [their] co-fighters . . . 
receive[s] a 15-year prison sentence in the Hague.”166  But equally, few believe 
that “ordinary” murderers consult national penal statutes and undertake cost-
benefit analyses before killing.  
Furthermore, as emphasized earlier, it would be misguided to 
assimilate all war criminals and génocidaires to a single psychosocial profile, 
say, that of the paranoid automaton, inculcated with hatred and psychologically 
conditioned to act as he does by propaganda, social pressure, primordial 
cultural influences, and so forth.  Often, elites responsible for large-scale or 
systematic international crimes can be described accurately as “conflict 
entrepreneurs,” those who manipulate values and the tools of state power as a 
means to aggrandize their own social, economic, or political power.167  This 
vision of the typical criminal not only seems intuitively more blameworthy 
than the rank-and-file perpetrator swept up in the “maelstrom of violence,” but 
also, perhaps, more deterrable.  While elites may calculate that the risk of 
apprehension and prosecution remains insignificant, the fact remains that they 
calculate, weighing costs and benefits in a manner that seems more susceptible 
to external incentives. 
Finally, the power of ICL to disempower elites through stigma and 
 
162 Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 603–17; see also Wippman, supra note 161, at 479 
(“The natural human tendency to obey authority is compounded by military training, propaganda 
vilifying members of the opposite community, a belief in the justice of one’s cause, and the threat of 
penalties, including execution, for failure to comply with orders.”). 
163 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1824), reprinted in 
JOHN STUART MILL & JEREMY BENTHAM, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 99 (Alan Ryan ed., 
Penguin Books 1987). 
164 JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 121 (rev. ed. 1983); see also id. at 123 (noting 
that a number of well-designed studies indicate that deterrence does work to some degree and in 
certain contexts). 
165 See id. at 117–21. 
166 Tallgren, supra note 3, at 567. 
167 See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule of Law,” 
101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2302 (2003). 
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reputational injury should not be underestimated.  “Leaders may be desperate, 
erratic, or even psychotic, but incitement to ethnic violence is usually aimed at 
the acquisition and sustained exercise of power. . . .  Momentary glory and 
political ascendancy, to be followed by downfall and humiliation, are 
considerably less attractive than long-term political viability.”168  In this regard, 
the mere issuance of an indictment, the very prospect of a trial, is itself the 
“punishment” by which ICL may deter.  While the deterrence value of ICL, 
conceived in utilitarian terms, remains largely aspirational, available empirical 
evidence does suggest that it has “dissuad[ed] some war crimes,” albeit not 
“general programs of extermination,” and its prospects may be enhanced by a 
“relatively credible threat of prosecution” where it matters the most, that is, 
relative to elites.169  
Still, to paraphrase Jeffrey Murphy’s summary of the problems with 
deterrence generally:  Some war criminals and génocidaires do not weigh the 
costs and benefits of criminal conduct in a dispassionate way (though it would 
likely be wrong to say that they act irrationally relative to their perceived 
interests).  Others, particularly megalomaniacal elites, calculate (often 
correctly), that they will get away with it, or that the risk of apprehension and 
prosecution remains small.  Still others may be so idiosyncratically devoted to 
genocide or ethnic cleansing as to be “undeterrable by anything short of 
massive military force, and maybe not even that.”170  Often, the chief war 
criminals will be coterminous with a state’s political elite; national 
prosecutorial and judicial institutions may be too corrupt or subservient to that 
elite class; and ordinary moral norms about the treatment of other human 
beings may be eroded, if not inverted, by the circumstances of war or 
perceived crisis.  While some elites may be susceptible to deterrence on the 
rational-actor model, other megalomaniacal tyrants—Milosevic, Pol Pot, Idi 
Amin, “Emperor” Bokassa—tend to share a psychological sense of infallibility 
and invulnerability that makes it less likely that they will rationally weigh the 
real probability of apprehension and prosecution, even if it can be increased, 
against their immediate goals:  power, territorial acquisition, or obliteration of 
an ethnic group.171  In his opening statement at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson 
 
168 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 146, at 12.  To maximize the deterrent value of ICL, 
then, prosecutors probably should focus, as they increasingly have, on increasing the real risk of 
apprehension and prosecution for the elites who orchestrate ICL crimes rather than the rank and file 
mobilized to carry them out.  Empirical studies validate a view expressed early on by Beccaria:  
“Crimes are more effectively prevented by the certainty than the severity of punishment.” Cesare 
Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764), in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 346, 349 (Morris R. Cohen & Felix S. Cohen eds., 1951); accord Prosecutor v. 
Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 290 (Dec. 10, 1998) (“It is the infallibility of punishment, rather 
than the severity of the sanction, which is the tool for retribution, stigmatisation, and deterrence.”).  
For an overview of the empirical work, see generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, ET AL., CRIMINAL 
DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH (1999). 
169 BASS, supra note 3, at 294.  From a pragmatic perspective, prosecuting elites, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, actually requires fewer resources relative to the breadth of the indictments than 
cases against low-level perpetrators, for the doctrine of command responsibility sweeps a wider 
evidentiary net, expands the limits of relevant evidence, and “[a]ccordingly, the temporal and 
geographical scope of evidence that may be invoked in support of prosecutions is very wide.”  
Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 779. 
170 BASS, supra note 3, at 291; see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 119 (1990). 
171 This is not, of course, to suggest that such figures cannot act rationally.  Saddam Hussein 
acted rationally when he agreed to permit U.N. inspectors back into the country in the wake of a 
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emphasized that “[p]ersonal punishment, to be suffered only in the event the 
war is lost, is probably not to be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where 
the war-makers feel the chances of defeat to be negligible.”172
Because of the institutional and resource constraints that plague 
international tribunals, their mere existence cannot be expected to enhance the 
prospects for deterrence very much.  Their efficacy depends more on their 
ability to contribute to the growth and development of national laws, ethical 
norms, and institutions, as well as to encourage and, at times, compel national 
criminal justice systems genuinely to investigate and prosecute.  For this 
reason, the expressive value of ICL sentences—the extent to which they 
convey, reinforce, and encourage the growth of national legal and moral norms 
that conform to ICL—matters more than the relative severity of the 
punishment in any individual case.  International criminal tribunals will deter 
most effectively, on the Benthamite model, if they encourage the growth of 
national institutions, laws, and ethical norms that can be applied with greater 
regularity and frequency. 
  
2. The Moral Educative Model  
 
General deterrence operates not only, or even primarily, through 
external restraints, that is, because subjects hear and fear the relevant 
sovereign’s commands backed by threats.173  The criminal law also deters 
through its long-term role in shaping, strengthening, and inculcating values, 
which encourages the development of habitual, internal restraints:174  “The law 
can discourage criminality not just by ‘raising the cost’ of such behavior 
through punishments, but also through instilling aversions to the kinds of 
behavior that the law prohibits.”175  In the long term, this effect of punishment 
likely deters far more criminal conduct than conscious rational calculation 
based on a fear of sanctions.  Most people do not resemble Holmes’s “bad 
man,” obeying the law based only on “a prophecy that if he does certain things 
he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or 
the compulsory payment of money.”176  In general, “the most effective form of 
law-enforcement is not the imposition of external sanction, but the inculcation 
of internal obedience.”177  Payam Akhavan, a strong proponent of this view 
relative to ICL, argues that criminal sanctions  
 
instill voluntary or “good faith” respect for just conduct by 
 
unanimously adopted Security Council resolution 1441. S.C. Res. 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 250 
(2003).  Slobodan Milosevic acted rationally when he agreed to the Dayton Peace Accords.  But the 
prospect of serving a sentence of incarceration for war crimes will be unlikely to enter into the rational 
calculations of such elites unless and until they believe that they may lose. 
172 II TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 102 (1947). 
173 See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832). 
174 Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 351.  
175 Kahan, supra note 17, at 603. 
176 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). 
177 Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L. REV. 
1397, 1401 (1999) 
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discrediting inhumane or unjust conduct, the cumulative effect 
of which encourages habitual or subliminal conformity with 
the law.  Thus, the prevention of future crimes is necessarily a 
long-term process of social and political transformation, 
entailing internalization of ideals in a particular context or 
“reality,” or the gradual penetration of principles into given 
power realities.178
 
This claim, however, brings us back full circle to the political, social, 
and psychological issues flagged earlier.  Deterrent mechanisms that rely on 
internal restraints, habituation to moral and legal norms, require a criminal 
justice system perceived as authoritative and legitimate.179  But many targets of 
ICL, persons willing to perpetrate unconscionable crimes, do not regard the 
system in that way.180  The rank and file, acting under the figurative 
compulsion of an inverted morality or collective pathology whereby ordinarily 
“prohibited conduct starts to appear as a holy obligation, a positive 
achievement,” will be unlikely to view their conduct as deviant relative to the 
community norms that matter most, that is, local ones.181  As for the elite, those 
who manipulate values in the service of power, they already, by hypothesis, 
lack the internalized norms by which the moral-educative effect of punishment 
is thought to operate.  
Finally, at least one study “suggests that the internalization of norms is 
not sufficient to prevent atrocities.”182  David Wippman, reviewing findings of 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on war crimes in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, notes that the ICRC concluded that such norms, while fully 
understood, supported, and accepted by combatants and civilians alike, “broke 
down under the pressure of nationalist passions and hatred.  They also broke 
down because a range of other wartime considerations diminished and 
superceded them.”183
These observations suggest that once the social, cultural, or political 
circumstances for the widespread manipulation of moral norms obtain, the 
efficacy of ICL as a mechanism of deterrence is slight.  As much as possible, 
we should strive to prevent, not only individual criminal acts, but the 
emergence of the sociopolitical circumstances that breed mass atrocities in the 
first place.184  Prophylactic strategies intended to address the roots of conflict 
 
178 Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 741. 
179 Kahan, supra note 17, at 603 (“This sort of preference adaptation [to values embodied in 
criminal law] is most likely to take place when citizens perceive the law as expressing society’s moral 
condemnation of such conduct.”). 
180 See, e.g., Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 
1967 (2001) (noting that “the logical prerequisite to moral education is a threshold level of social 
consensus that the prosecution process is itself legitimate,” yet “[a]t present, a large proportion of the 
populations of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda may not see the tribunals as sufficiently legitimate 
to heed the moral lessons the tribunals seek to teach”); Wippman, supra note 161, at 486 (“Serbs, for 
example, view the ICTY as biased, and might therefore refuse to accept its judgments as confirming 
important social norms.”). 
181 Tallgren, supra note 3, at 571–574. 
182 Wippman, supra note 161, at 486. 
183 Id. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
184 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 146, at 11 (“The focus of punishment should be the 
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and to forestall, for example, the emergence of “failed states” or the 
polarization of ethnic and national groups should be the principal focus of 
international efforts.  To the extent that ICL distracts from these objectives, it 
is counterproductive.  ICL would more effectively contribute to the process of 
norm internalization and stabilization by maximizing its synergy with other 
mutually reinforcing strategies, including communications, development 
assistance, international human rights policy, the spread of liberal 
constitutionalism and democracy, diplomacy, and economic incentives. 
Analysis of the viability and coherence of deterrence in ICL thus 
yields two overarching conclusions relevant to sentencing:  First, it supports 
Danner’s view, echoing H.L.A. Hart, that while deterrence may offer sound 
reasons to establish an international criminal justice system, it provides scant 
“guidance in determining the lengths of particular sentences.”185  Judges in the 
international context, even more than in the national, lack sufficient, and 
sufficiently reliable, information to assess logically the “costs and benefits of 
imposing a sentence of any particular length in individual cases.”186  Second, 
punishment’s absolute severity in quantitative terms matters less than its 
relative severity as an expression of the condemnation that attends particular 
criminal acts under the circumstances.  A sentence that local institutions and 
actors view as cogent, legitimate, authoritative, and persuasive, one 
disseminated to the broadest possible audience, may contribute to the long-
term project of preventing ICL crimes through mediums other than direct 
communication of a threat to potential criminals—for example, by its influence 
on national jurisprudence, rules of conduct integrated into military manuals 
distributed to soldiers, the media, and in the long term, the values and 
perceptions that predominate “in the elite culture of international diplomacy as 
well as world public opinion in general.”187  
 
B.  Retribution  
 
Retributive justifications for ICL punishment, while historically 
predominant, emerge as problematic from several perspectives.  Above all, 
despite the prevalence of secular philosophical versions, retributivism—with 
its characteristic discourse of “just deserts,” blameworthiness, and the 
restoration of some moral balance—remains strongly redolent of religious 
notions of justice ill-suited to a diverse international community of states and 
peoples.188  And secular justifications for retributivism transposed to the ICL 
 
prevention of . . . deliberately induced aberrant contexts, within which habitually lawful social 
relations degenerate into unrestrained violence,” for “[o]nce the population has fallen prey to a 
collective psychosis of ethnic fear and hatred, violent behavior becomes exceedingly difficult to 
circumscribe through threats of punishment.”). 
185 Danner, supra note 1, at 447. 
186 Id.; see also id. at 449 (“Without any empirical study, there is simply no reliable way to 
determine how much deterrent effect a particular sentence will have, even assuming that marginal 
differences in sentence length exert different deterrent effects.”). 
187 Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 742. 
188 See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 347 (emphasizing that retributive sentiments “are often 
supported by notions of divine punishment for those who disobey God’s laws,” or more generally, by 
the notion that “punishment restores the moral order that has been breached by the original wrongful 
act”). 
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context make little sense largely because they presuppose a more coherent, 
univocal, and stable community than international law offers. 
 
1. Retribution as Vengeance Regulation 
 
One prevailing legal-anthropological model of retribution—which 
strictly speaking, should be regarded as a kind of utilitarianism—views it as a 
socially condoned substitute for vengeance.189  “The criminal law,” in 
Stephen’s oft-quoted maxim, “stands to the passion of revenge in much the 
same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite.”190  Acts of retaliatory 
violence, if left unchecked, threaten to destroy the social bonds of the 
community.  The institutions of criminal justice must therefore enable the 
discharge of instinctual desires for vengeance in an orderly, socially palatable 
manner.  Punishment, on this view, is the means by which the state terminates 
the otherwise escalating cycles of retaliatory violence within its community.191  
René Girard argues, for instance, that ritual sacrifice in ancient societies 
prevented their self-destruction, precipitated by the escalation of cycles of 
retaliatory violence.192  The criminal law gradually assumes the role of 
regulating private vengeance or, euphemistically, administering justice.193  
Failure to fulfill this function culminates in the chaotic discharge of retributive 
instincts, characteristically in the form of large-scale violence. 
The anthropological vision of escalating blood feuds and patterns of 
collective violence conjured by Girard’s thesis resonates with our view of the 
cataclysmic circumstances caused by war, chaotic collapse of the state, and 
mass violence that characterize cases of widespread ICL violations like, for 
example, the cycles of interethnic violence between Hutus and Tutsis in 
twentieth-century Rwanda or Croats and Serbs in the Balkans.194  Indeed, as 
Arendt wrote, despite some perfunctory nods in the direction of deterrence, 
Eichmann’s trial remained fundamentally about retribution in this theological, 
 
189 HOLMES, supra note 160, at 35 (“It certainly may be argued, with some force, that it has never 
ceased to be one object of punishment to satisfy the desire for vengeance.”).  That retributivism may 
originate in vengeance regulation does not mean that it must remain committed to the view that 
“punishment of offenders satisfies the desires for vengeance of their victims” or that “punishment is 
justified because without it vengeful citizens would take the law into their own hands,” for “the need 
to prevent private violence . . . is an essentially utilitarian justification.”  Michael S. Moore, The Moral 
Worth of Retribution, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 94, 95 (Jeffrie G. 
Murphy ed., 1995). 
190 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 1 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (London, 
MacMillan 1883). 
191 Archaic law codes consistently manifest a concern with vengeance regulation.  See James Q. 
Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutilation of Bodies, or 
Setting of Prices, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41, 42 (1995). 
192 See RENÉ GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED 8 (1972). 
193 Id. at 15. 
194 I do not mean to imply the oft-criticized view that the Rwandan genocide reflected no more 
than the reemergence of historical or primordial ethnic animosity.  Studies of the genocide uniformly 
reject this view and emphasize the extent to which elites manipulated and exacerbated latent ethnic 
tensions as a means to political power.  See generally ALISON DESFORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL 
THE STORY (1999); PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE 
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998).  Equally, most scholars reject the vision of the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia as the inevitable explosion of latent ethnic tensions between Bosnian Muslims, 
Croats, and Serbs in the aftermath of the demise of Tito’s iron-fisted rule. 
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quasi-talionic sense: 
 
We refuse, and consider as barbaric, the propositions “that a 
great crime offends nature, so that the very earth cries out for 
vengeance; that evil violates a natural harmony which only 
retribution can restore; that a wronged collectivity owes a duty 
to the moral order to punish the criminal” (Yosal Rogat).  And 
yet I think it is undeniable that it was precisely on the ground 
of these long-forgotten propositions that Eichmann was 
brought to justice to begin with, and that they were, in fact, the 
supreme justification for the death penalty.195
 
Some prominent jurists and scholars ascribe a comparable function to the ad 
hoc tribunals.196   
On reflection, however, this view of retribution as a response to 
modern ethnic “blood feuds”—and arguably, therefore, a proper rationale for 
ICL punishment—makes little sense.  In the first place, the figurative nature of 
the international community renders the paradigm inapposite.  Retributive 
views of punishment rooted in lex talionis,197 whether anthropological or 
philosophical, depend on a conception of justice as a value that arises within a 
single, coherent community.  ICL, however, must mediate between the 
interests of multiple communities, both literal and figurative, and international 
tribunals generally lack the local legitimacy required as a practical matter to 
discharge the anthropological function of vengeance regulation.  They 
represent the amorphous international community rather than the literal 
“wronged collectivity,” that is, the particular local community purportedly 
“unbalanced” by the crimes.  The personnel, rules, and institutions that 
comprise international tribunals conform to and promote international rather 
than local legal, social, and moral norms.  It is far from clear how punishment 
by an international tribunal, which derives its authority from either treaty or a 
Security Council resolution (at bottom, a function of state consent to the U.N. 
Charter, itself a multilateral treaty), can be a legitimate proxy for the penal 
interests of the literal victims who suffer extraordinary crimes of violence.  
This disjuncture may well be a major reason that international tribunals often 
suffer from a perceived lack of legitimacy in relation to affected local 
communities or states.   
And even were international tribunals able to act as proxies for 
disabled local institutions, the collective nature of international crimes renders 
the idea of punishment as the socialized discharge of communal instincts for 
vengeance misguided at best:  What sense does it make to speak of a “wronged 
 
195 ARENDT, supra note 7, at 277. 
196 E.g., International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, First Annual Report, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/49/342, S/1994/1007 (July 28, 1994) (report of then President of the ICTY Antonio Cassese) 
(stating that the “only civilized alternative to this desire for revenge is to render justice,” lest “feelings 
of hatred and resentment seething below the surface . . . , sooner or later, re-erupt and lead to renewed 
violence”); see also Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 
1967–68 (2001) 
197 But see Moore, supra note 189, at 94–95 (describing common misperceptions about 
retribution, including that it necessarily implies some commitment to lex talionis). 
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collectivity” where that very collectivity, in many cases, bears some culpability 
or moral responsibility for the relevant wrong?  We can see this problem more 
clearly by turning to the conventional philosophical justifications for 
retribution, which, unlike Girard’s anthropological vision, insist on the Kantian 
maxim that punishment never be inflicted solely as a means to an extrinsic end:  
order, vengeance regulation, and so forth.198
 
2. The “Unfair Advantage” Thesis  
 
A prominent philosophical variant of retributivism, the “unfair 
advantage” or “benefits-and-burdens” thesis,199 justifies retribution by positing 
a quasi-contractual relationship between individuals in a society.  On this view, 
punishment is “a debt owed to the law-abiding members of one’s community; 
and, once paid, it allows re-entry into the community of good citizens on equal 
status.”200  Herbert Morris explains punishment similarly:  The criminal law 
specifies rules of conduct that benefit all members of a society while imposing 
a corresponding burden of “self-restraint” on each;201 when a person violates 
those rules, “he has something others have—the benefits of the system—but by 
renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint, he has 
acquired an unfair advantage. . . .  Justice—that is, punishing such 
individuals—restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from 
the individual what he owes, that is, exacting a debt.”202
 These contractual models of retributive punishment, as the 
exaction of a debt owed to society, also make little sense in the ICL context.  
In the first place, it would be bizarre to conceptualize the génocidaire as a free-
rider on the hypothetical social contract of others not to destroy national, 
ethnic, racial, or religious groups,203 or to regard a serious human rights abuser 
as arrogating to himself a benefit that others voluntarily relinquished in their 
common interest.204  An economic view of criminal justice as redistributing 
 
198 Kant famously wrote that “only the law of retribution (jus talionis) . . . can specify definitely 
the quality and quantity of punishment; all other principles are fluctuating and unsuited for a sentence 
of pure and strict justice because extraneous considerations are mixed into them.”  IMMANUEL KANT, 
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 332 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1991) 
(1797). 
199 See Andrew von Hirsch, Censure & Proportionality, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 115, 116–
18 (Anthony Duff & David Garland eds. 1994) (overview and criticism of the “unfair advantage” 
theory). 
200 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973).  
201 Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (Oct. 1968). 
202 Id.  For criticism of the so-called “unjust advantage” theory of retribution, see von Hirsch, 
supra note 199, at 116–18 & n.4.  As von Hirsch notes, both Murphy and Morris have since backed 
away from this view.  Id. at 116, 130 n.2. 
203 Genocide Convention, supra note 80, art. 2.   
204 Retributive theories of the “unfair advantage” variety may offer a more coherent justification 
for punishment of war crimes.  It makes some sense to conceive of the laws of war as a body of 
conduct agreed to by states for their mutual benefit.  Violations, on this view, give rise to an 
imbalance of benefits and burdens, which punishment rectifies.  Indeed, the laws of war historically 
recognized a practice redolent of this view, reprisals, whereby violations of the laws of war by one 
state gave rise to a reciprocal right of the other state to engage in otherwise prohibited wartime 
conduct.  Punishment of individuals for war crimes might be conceived along similar lines as a means 
of restoring the balance of benefits and burdens disturbed by violations of rules established for the 
mutual benefit of combatants.  In the modern era, however, this reciprocity rationale for the laws of 
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benefits and burdens does not comport with our conception of crimes of 
extraordinary brutality.  Furthermore, conceptualizing the war criminal or 
génocidaire as a deviant from social norms may make little sense where the 
criminal conduct would be more accurately described as conforming to a norm 
that prevails within the criminal’s literal community, be it national, ethnic, 
racial, or martial.205
Finally, the circumstances of widespread ICL violations frequently 
involve the state not as the societal entity ensuring a just distribution of 
benefits and burdens, but on the contrary, as a prime force disrupting that 
distribution.  The state, which in national criminal justice systems would be 
conceived, on the retributivist view, as the obligee to which the criminal owes 
a societal debt, emerges in the ICL context as an entity that may well share 
culpability for the crime—for international crimes characteristically require the 
collective cloak of authority that only the state or cognate entities (for example, 
tribal authorities or paramilitaries) can confer on individuals.  The paradigm of 
retribution as a mechanism for restoring the balance of benefits and burdens 
between society and its members therefore seems utterly misplaced as applied 
to ICL crimes.  To punish an individual perpetrator does not redistribute 
benefits and burdens or avert blood feuds threatened by unharnessed cycles of 
retaliatory vengeance, enabling a balancing of the communal scales or the 
maintenance of order within a nation-state.  In fact, as the Serbian reaction to 
Milosevic’s trial by the ICTY suggests, international criminal trials may well 
increase local dissonance and societal resentment within implicated nation-
states and local communities, at least in the short term.  The community that 
authorizes punishment, in short, might not be the one to which the purported 
societal debt is owed. 
Retribution therefore emerges as a problematic justification for ICL 
punishment in large part because it presupposes both a coherent community 
and a relatively stable sociopolitical or legal order characterized by shared 
values.  The circumstances that enable widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights atrocities generally involve the breakdown 
of precisely that order.  “Where no civil law is,” Hobbes wrote, “there is no 
crime.”206
  
C.  Expressive Proportionality 
 
The retributive paradigm also seems misplaced in the ICL context 
because it apparently offers little guidance on proportionality.  In a talionic 
sense, of course, no punishment can fit the most horrendous international 
crimes:  slaughter of innocent civilians, systematic rape as a tool of war or 
genocide, and so forth.  At the same time, the circumstances of extraordinary 
 
war would strike many as at least partially anachronistic.  International human rights law has 
reconceptualized international humanitarian law, in substantial part, as the human rights component of 
the laws of war, a body of standards designed to guarantee minimal levels of human dignity and 
decency even in times of systematic violence; hence modern international humanitarian law outlaws 
reprisals in all circumstances.    
205 See ARENDT, supra note 7, at 294–95; Drumbl, supra note 4, at 549–50, 567; Tallgren, supra 
note 3, at 573–75. 
206 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 190 (M. Oakshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1957) (1651). 
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crime strain our intuitions about desert.  Consider the well-known case of 
Drazen Erdemović:  What punishment, if any, befits a soldier who chose under 
duress, a threat to his own life, to participate in the summary execution of 
hundreds of Muslim civilians?207  (Tellingly, the jurisprudential debate in 
Erdemović focused less on speculation about deterrence—both the plurality 
and the dissent agreed that their decisions would be unlikely to affect the 
behavior of persons confronted with like circumstances in future conflicts—
than on the proper message to be expressed by the sentence.)  This case, while 
unique in the overt manner in which it highlights moral and legal issues that 
ordinarily remain obscured by the sheer brutality of the crimes, raises 
questions about the extent to which the criminal law can realistically regulate 
brutal violence in circumstances where crime becomes, to some degree, 
normative.208  For purposes of proportionality, the gravity of the harm caused 
by an ICL violation seldom offers a particularly helpful metric; rather, context, 
“the individual circumstances of the convicted person,”209 is crucial. 
International human rights law implicitly adopts the key Kantian 
principles that animate modern retributive theories:  first, that punishment, 
while it may also serve broader social goals, must never regard the punished 
instrumentally in the first instance, as a mere means to an end; and second, that 
culpability is at least a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for 
punishment.210  It therefore forbids, for example, exemplary justice, even if that 
would better serve other legitimate penal objectives of the international 
criminal justice system, such as deterrence.  These principles impose 
constraints on both the absolute and relative severity of punishment, cardinal 
and ordinal proportionality.  Of course, given the nature of the crimes at issue, 
efforts to calibrate crime and punishment according to the lex talionis principle 
would apparently require punishments that contemporary international human 
rights law prohibits.211  What Beccaria wrote in relation to capital punishment 
seems apt here:  “If the passions, or the necessity of war, have taught men to 
shed the blood of their fellow creatures, the laws, which are intended to 
moderate the ferocity of mankind, should not increase it by examples of 
barbarity . . . .”212  ICL should be shaped, insofar as possible, to reinforce the 
core norms that it shares with international human rights law.  Retributivism of 
the lex talionis variety has no place in this body of law. 
But the expressive dimensions of retributivism nonetheless offer 
proportionality guidance.  Few contemporary retributivists defend a lex talionis 
conception of proportionality.  Andrew von Hirsch, for example, offers a 
retributive conception of ordinal proportionality that is parasitic on the 
expressive function of punishment.213  It does not posit an a priori notion of the 
 
207 See generally Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A (Oct. 7, 1997). 
208 See generally Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity and Duress, 43 
VA. J. INT’L L. 861 (2003). 
209 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 78, ¶ 1. 
210 Moore, supra note 189, at 94. 
211 Drumbl, supra note 4, at 581. 
212 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764), in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 346, 351 (Morris R. Cohen & Felix S. Cohen eds., 1951). 
213 von Hirsch, supra note 199, at 125. 
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right penalty for different crimes, by reference to lex talionis or otherwise; it 
requires only that more culpable crimes be more severely punished.  While a 
coherent ICL sentencing scheme requires some account of cardinal 
proportionality, the question how to assign a baseline, an anchor against which 
ICL crimes can be hierarchically ordered, seems less vital to the enterprise.  
The arbitrary establishment, but consistent application, of cardinal guidelines 
may be the best we can expect.  It would be absurd to suppose that any 
particular term of years represents the correct penalty for, say, grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions.  
One coherent, legitimate, and feasible basis for ordinal proportionality 
in international sentencing, however, is expressive:  Punishments should 
convey the right degree of international condemnation relative to other 
defendants within the jurisdiction of the relevant tribunal.  To maintain its 
legitimacy, an international tribunal must express censure, disapproval, and 
condemnation equally across disparate local circumstances.  Genocide should 
not be punished more or less severely in Rwanda than in the former 
Yugoslavia.  This is emphatically not to say that every conviction for genocide 
merits a sentence of equal length.  The expressive value of a sentence—its 
legitimacy and authority—depends on the extent to which it both embodies the 
moral and legal norms of the authorizing community and fits the circumstances 
of the offender in light of those norms.  
Emphasizing the expressive function of punishment in the context of 
ICL would enable tribunals to begin to address proportionality in a non-
arbitrary way.  No punishment, from a crude talionic perspective, can fit 
serious human rights atrocities, and any effort to rationalize ordinal 
proportionality on this basis would be doomed to futility.  But from an 
expressive perspective, we can make rational judgments of proportionality 
consistent with a plausible concept of justice:  “What justice demands is that 
the condemnatory aspect of the punishment suit the crime . . . .  [T]he degree 
of disapproval expressed by the punishment should ‘fit’ the crime only in the 
unproblematic sense that the more serious crimes should receive stronger 
disapproval than the less serious ones . . . .”214
Where, in an international context, criminal conduct becomes 
normative, crimes by rank-and-file perpetrators should generally not be 
deemed as blameworthy as those by the elites responsible for creating the 
normative conditions conducive to those crimes.  By reference to international 
penal interests, for example, Duško Tadić’s harms obviously pale in 
comparison with those of, say, Radovan Karadzic or Ratko Mladic.  By 
embracing an expressive account of proportionality and reorienting the metric 
of retributivism to the penal interests of the international community, we can 
begin to calibrate crime and punishment in ICL sentencing in a non-arbitrary 
fashion notwithstanding that, emotively, virtually all of the relevant crimes 
seem to demand the harshest penalties.  For retribution, as for deterrence, the 
principal value of ICL punishment therefore lies in its expressive 
dimensions.215  As the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY rightly emphasized, 
 
214 FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 118. 
215 Embracing an expressive function for ICL sentencing does not mean abandoning the side-
constraint imposed by justice or “just deserts” theories:  that individuals not be treated solely as a 
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retribution in ICL “is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge but 
as duly expressing the outrage of the international community at these 
crimes.”216  
 
D.  Audience and Expressive Clarity 
 
Critiques of expressivism in international criminal justice focus on the 
potential distortion of the message.217  What does even a comparatively long 
prison term for genocide communicate to a victim if the otherwise applicable 
national system would prescribe death for the same or an analogous crime?  
And how well do the channels for punitive communication work between 
international and national fora?218  The expressive dimensions of punishment 
depend on its ability to convey the right meaning against the background of 
particular social norms,219 which vary significantly between the states, 
societies, cultures, and other constituencies that comprise the international 
community.  In part, the strong cross-cultural consensus that incarceration 
expresses condemnation mitigates this problem.  But the force of this 
objection, in my judgment, counsels greater attention to communication and 
public education strategies in ICL, a focus on making the ICL sentencing 
process more effectively express the extraordinarily high level of international 
condemnation of ICL crimes.  Below, I suggest some potential steps that the 
ICC, for example, might take in this direction. 
Yet the effective communication that matters in the expressivist view 
is not only that contained in the message to the convicted person or a potential 
 
means to an extrinsic social end.  To the contrary, the right to punish remains rooted in the 
acknowledgment of human beings as moral agents.  Modulating the degree of punishment for 
expressive purposes—particularly once we recognize that no metaphysically correct term of 
incarceration corresponds to the gravity of the harm—is not objectionable based on the Kantian 
maxim. 
216 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Judgment, ¶ 185 (Mar. 24, 2000); accord 
Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24, Judgment, ¶ 40 (July 31, 2003); see also Prosecutor v. 
Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14, ¶ 484 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-
96-3, ¶ 456 (Dec. 6, 1999) (penalties “show . . . that the international community shall not tolerate the 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights); Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case 
No. IT-96-22-T, ¶ 20–21 (Mar. 5, 1998) (ICTY “a vehicle through which the international community 
expresses its outrage at the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia”). 
217 E.g., Alvarez, supra note 1, at 458 (arguing that “even if one were to agree that high 
government officials’ actions, given their greater cumulative impact, merit graver punishment, this 
message is compromised . . . by contemporaneous sentences being handed down by Rwandan courts,” 
which “blunt the symbolic or deterrent value that exceptionalism seeks to achieve”); Danner, supra 
note 1, at 491 n.310 (noting that “the validity of the expressive theory of punishment depends on 
factors external to the punishment itself,” and that “[t]his problem has been especially acute in the 
countries of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where the media have either distorted the message or 
failed to deliver it at all”); Drumbl, supra note 4, at 593 (arguing that “the expressive value of law and 
punishment is weakened by selectivity and indeterminacy in the operationalization of law and 
punishment, as well as the political contingency of the entire enterprise,” and that the expressive value 
of punishment will frequently be “externalized from afflicted local communities owing to the distance 
and mistrust evidenced between such communities and the machinery of international criminal 
justice”); Tallgren, supra note 3, at 583 (arguing that cross-cultural and cross-national distinctions in 
the severity and meaning of varying punishments interferes with the clarity of the message conveyed 
by international criminal justice and may, to some audiences, even distort it in counterproductive 
ways). 
218 See Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1971–72 
& n.88 (2001). 
219 See Kahan, supra note 17, at 597–601. 
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future criminal.  Expressivism, echoing Durkheim, focuses in part on the value 
of punishment to the community itself,220 in this case the figurative 
international community.  “The intended audience of such exhortations is not 
just the wrongdoer of most concern to deterrence and retributive theorists.  It is 
also the Everyone of most interest to expressive theorists:  the law-abider and 
the lawmaker, the activist and the private citizen, and even the potential victim, 
today and tomorrow.”221  The expressive function of punishment serves the 
communicator, not only the recipient of the punishment or the rogue states or 
tyrannical leaders to whom it may convey a message.  Like-minded law-
abiding states and citizens—for example, those comprising the assembly of 
states parties to the ICC—benefit from the affirmation of a common 
commitment to international human rights norms and the rule of law, and the 
sentencing process contributes to the formation of consensus on the propriety 
and meaning of different punishments.222  Over time, punishment by 
international criminal tribunals can shape as well as express social norms.  And 
the international sentencing process can reinforce and vindicate those norms 
even if it cannot, alone, realistically be expected to deter or fulfill retributive 
aspirations held by each affected local constituency. 
 
E.  Rehabilitation: Literal, Societal, and Theological  
 
International human rights law, as noted, emphasizes rehabilitation as 
the paramount goal of punishment.  Few, of course, expect war criminals to 
repent after serving their sentences and return to duty as model soldiers, or 
megalomaniacal elites to see the error of their ways and become benevolent 
dictators or benign elected officials in the future.  Nor do many worry about 
recidivism, for “the likelihood of persons convicted [by international criminal 
tribunals] ever again being faced with an opportunity to commit war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide or grave breaches is so remote as to render 
its consideration in this way unreasonable and unfair.”223  Relative to ICL, 
rehabilitation, conceived in crime-control rather than humanistic terms, seems 
an inapposite goal.  Perhaps for that reason, for all its prominence in 
international human rights law, it seldom receives attention in judicial 
judgments or scholarly analyses of the goals of international sentencing.224  In 
an early judgment, the ICTY said that “it would seem that the particularities of 
crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal rule out 
consideration of the rehabilitative function of punishment.”225  
 
220 EMILE DURKEHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., Free Press, 
1984) (1893). 
221 Amann, supra note 48, at 124. 
222 See Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 516. 
223 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No., IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, ¶ 840 (Feb. 22, 2001). 
224 A notable exception is Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16. 
225 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, ¶ 66 (Nov. 29, 1996).  Rehabilitative 
considerations may nonetheless have tacitly influenced the Tribunal’s ultimate sentencing 
determination.  Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 505 (observing that “despite the 
theory, the Trial Chamber appears to have imposed a sentence that is fundamentally clement, that 
appropriately considers a host of mitigating factors, and that notably takes into account the fact that 
the condemned man is remorseful and a good candidate for rehabilitation”). 
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The ICTY has since recognized rehabilitation as a potential objective 
of ICL punishment but described it in quasi-religious terms redolent of Martin 
Buber:226  “[T]he process of coming face-to-face with the statements of victims, 
if not the victims themselves, can inspire—if not reawaken—tolerance and 
understanding of ‘the other,’ thereby making it less likely that if given an 
opportunity to act in a discriminatory manner again, an accused would do so.  
Reconciliation and peace would thereby be promoted.”227  As this passage 
makes clear, the idea of rehabilitation encompasses several distinct goals, some 
more relevant to, or practicable for, ICL sentencing than others. 
Rehabilitation traditionally implied a social vision of the criminal as 
metaphorically if not literally sick and therefore in need of treatment.  This 
medical model fell out of favor in the 1970s and 1980s, in large part, 
philosophically, because of its perceived denial of autonomy and moral 
agency, and practically, because of its perceived failure.228  Rehabilitation of 
the medical model variety finds virtually no expression or support in the 
judgments of the ad hoc tribunals.  Given the body of literature emphasizing 
the need to appreciate that psychosocial circumstances cause or contribute to 
collective crimes of extraordinary hatred and violence, this omission seems 
odd, even ironic.  Many rank-and-file perpetrators of ICL crimes, on this view, 
should be conceived not as inherently evil but as average, all-too-human 
individuals who fell victim to manipulation by elites, rendering them 
metaphorically sick with irrational fear, nationalist passion, or hatred.  Many 
Bosnian Serbs, for example, were indoctrinated to believe that their Muslim 
neighbors, with foreign help, were poised to wage an imminent jihad against 
them and thus saw their crimes against Bosnian Muslims as self-defense.  
Plausibly, under ordinary circumstances, they would not have been inclined to 
commit crimes, let alone war crimes or crimes against humanity.  
Today, the ICC faces the question of how to deal justly with rebel 
soldiers of the LRA abducted as children and indoctrinated through example 
and extraordinarily brutal conditioning, which over time desensitized them and 
made them willing participants in terrible crimes, including mutilation, rape, 
mass killing of civilians, and other ICL crimes.  From a retributive perspective, 
it defies our intuitions to assert that children in circumstances like these 
deserve punishment; from a deterrent perspective, it would be absurd to 
suppose that children abducted and indoctrinated by violent conditioning can 
be significantly, if at all, deterred by the remote threat of prosecution.  Nor will 
deterrence as a project of gradual norm penetration make a difference in this 
context; the normative universe in which children abducted by the LRA reach 
the age of criminal responsibility (eighteen, according to international law) 
destroys any habitual inhibitions against violence.  
Realistically, the Prosecutor would be unlikely to go forward in these 
circumstances.229  But child soldiers of the LRA highlight the problematic 
 
226 See generally MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Walter Kaufmann trans. & ed. 1970). 
227 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 93 (Dec. 2, 2003). 
228 See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL 
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About 
Prison Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974. 
229 The ICC lacks personal jurisdiction over persons under the age of eighteen at the time of the 
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nature of moral responsibility in the ICL context.230  Arguably, some rank-and-
file participants in serious international crimes can to some degree be likened 
to this extreme case—hence the recurrent emphasis in the critical literature on 
social psychology and collective responsibility issues.  On the one hand, as 
emphasized, it would be a mistake to assimilate all war criminals to this vision.  
But it would be just as mistaken to ignore the extent to which history and 
research show that “acts of exceptional cruelty can indeed be committed by 
‘ordinary people’ under special circumstances.”231  We have no reason to think, 
to take a hyperbolic case, that someone guilty of summary executions in the 
context of a brutal civil war, with atrocities committed on all sides, would be a 
serial killer in a relatively stable, peacetime society.  Some low-level 
perpetrators may be suitable candidates for rehabilitation, and it would be 
contrary to the spirit if not the letter of international human rights law to refuse 
to consider mitigation in such cases.  Undoubtedly, rehabilitative 
considerations will in some cases conflict with the retributive penal interests of 
the victims.  Where such conflicts exist, justice and the proper scope of 
international penal interests, including the synergy between ICL and 
international human rights norms, should prevail.  The extent to which 
collective psychosocial factors should be deemed to mitigate culpability can 
be—and, I believe, should be—addressed at the sentencing stage, where 
considerations of factual guilt no longer impair a more searching inquiry into 
the relative culpability of particular defendants acting under diverse 
circumstances.  
Rehabilitation in this literal sense, however, has received far less 
attention than the idea, again based on a questionable analogy, that 
international criminal justice can contribute to the figurative “rehabilitation” of 
communities riven by ethnic strife, war, a history of human rights atrocities, 
and so forth.232  Many see this potential goal as a function of the individuation 
of guilt ostensibly fostered by ICL:  “Blame should not rest on an entire nation 
but should be assigned to individual perpetrators of crimes and the responsible 
leaders.”233  To punish individuals, on this view, can absolve others as well as 
 
relevant offense, Rome Statute, art. 26, and the Statute gives the Prosecutor discretion to decline to 
investigate where despite “the gravity of the crime and interests of victims, there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”  Rome 
Statute, supra note 4, arts. 26, 53(c). 
230 See Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting 
Children for Participating in Internal Armed Conflict, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 629 (1997). 
231 Tallgren, supra note 3, at 574; see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 569. 
232 E.g., TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE’S GHOSTS AFTER 
COMMUNISM xviii (1995) (“Nations, like individuals, need to face up to and understand traumatic past 
events before they can put them aside and move on to a normal life.”); Fletcher & Weinstein, supra 
note 8, at 597 (“The transitional justice literature is replete with discussion of the need for societies to 
‘heal’ after mass violence.”); Turner, supra note 38, at 27. 
233 THEODOR MERON, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, in WAR CRIMES LAW 
COMES OF AGE 187, 196 (1998); see also Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 598 & n.87 (noting 
that a broad spectrum of scholars and jurists, including Karl Jaspers, Antonio Cassese, Payam 
Akhavan, and Aryeh Neir embrace some variant of the view “that holding individuals accountable for 
[ICL crimes] alleviates collective guilt by differentiating between the perpetrators and innocent 
bystanders, thus promoting reconciliation”); Richard J. Goldstone, Fifty Years After Nuremberg: A 
New International Criminal Tribunal for Human Rights Criminals, in CONTEMPORARY GENOCIDES: 
CAUSES, CASES, CONSEQUENCES 215 (Albert J. Jonman ed. 1996); Jelena Pejic, Creating an 
Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 292 (1998). 
88 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43:39 
 
                                                
the collective society from which they originate, enabling its reintegration into 
the figurative international community—as, for example, when the United 
Nations welcomed Yugoslavia back after its surrender of Milosevic to the 
ICTY.  
Unfortunately, these views rest on questionable “theological and 
medical models” that have “solidified into articles of faith” rather than 
experience or research.234  Studies of the effect of the Nuremberg trials on 
postwar Germans, for example, remain inconclusive at best,235 and scant 
evidence suggests that this project of collective absolution has worked in either 
Bosnia or Rwanda.  In fact, in Serbia, reports indicate that the prosecution of 
Milosevic, far from delegitimizing him, has been perceived as a reflection of 
international persecution of Serbs, emboldening Serbian nationalists.  Within 
states, as the South African experience shows, truth commissions may well be 
more effective at achieving collective rehabilitation.  ICL, at least as applied 
by international tribunals, is not particularly well-tooled to pursue societal 
rehabilitation.  
Furthermore, as several scholars emphasize, the liberal presumption 
against collective guilt biases us against and obscures the almost invariable 
collective element of ICL crimes, which casts doubt on a criminal law 
paradigm that hermetically separates the guilty from the innocent.  At times, 
the state or another collective entity does bear blame or responsibility, even if 
the relative culpability of different actors that comprise that collective entity 
differs dramatically—from the passive acquiescence of the bystander to the 
(reluctant or enthusiastic) participation of the rank-and-file perpetrator to the 
deliberate incitement of the demagogue.236  
Above all, perhaps, we should recognize that while aspirations about 
reconciliation and national healing may at times be laudable by-products of 
international criminal justice, they do not count as self-sufficient reasons to 
sentence a particular perpetrator more or less severely.  Similarly, we can 
debate the plausibility, validity, or propriety of the Security Council’s assertion 
that establishing the ad hoc tribunals will contribute to the restoration of 
international peace and security.  But it would be odd, if not inappropriate, to 
sentence someone to more or less time in prison based solely on this aspiration.  
The Rome Statute expresses these goals in its preamble but rightly, in my 
view, says nothing about them in its provisions on sentencing. 
 
CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL SENTENCING REFORM AND THE ROME 
STATUTE 
 
If the principal value served by ICL punishment is expressive, what 
implications does this have for the substance and process of sentencing by 
international criminal tribunals?  I would suggest three:  First and foremost, 
 
234 Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 600–601. 
235 See TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 at 53–54, 58 (2005). 
236 Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 581; see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 568; Fletcher, 
supra note 11.  Perhaps the most well-known exploration of these issues remains KARL JASPERS, THE 
QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT (1947). 
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distinct sentencing hearings, which the ICTY abandoned for expedience, 
should be reinstituted by the ICC and made an essential stage in the process of 
international criminal justice, not an “afterthought.”237  Second, the ICC and 
ICL jurisprudence generally should develop—not rigid sentencing guidelines 
of the kind brought into disrepute by the federal Sentencing Reform Act238—
but a rational (if flexible) scheme to convey aggravating and mitigating factors, 
which should take into account the defendant’s individual circumstances and 
role relative to the state, military unit, or other collective entity implicated by 
the crimes of conviction.  Finally, international criminal tribunals should work 
to enhance the expressive potential of sentencing by ensuring the widespread 
publication and dissemination of judgments to the broadest possible audience 
and by maximizing the level of cooperation and jurisprudential exchange 
between national and international criminal justice institutions. 
Sentencing, in international no less than national criminal law, should 
be “a ritual of manifest moral significance.”239  Indeed, the formal expression 
of communal condemnation assumes dramatic importance in ICL, where the 
standard justifications for and goals ostensibly served by criminal 
punishment—deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation—seem 
less plausible, legitimate or efficacious.  Yet after a few early experiments with 
holding a distinct sentencing phase,240 the ad hoc tribunals abandoned this 
procedure by amendments to their internal rules, apparently based on 
considerations of expedience and cost,241 and perhaps also on the unfamiliarity 
of sentencing hearings to international judges from civil law states.  Instead, 
the tribunals now typically append their sentencing determinations to 
voluminous written judgments, rendering them relatively obscure and 
inaccessible to the public and largely eviscerating their distinctive symbolic 
significance.  Furthermore, because the tribunals tend to issue a single sentence 
intended to cover the “totality of an accused’s conduct,” it becomes “difficult 
to determine the range of sentences for each specific crime.”242  This is 
unfortunate, for “transactional” sentencing of this sort,243 however expedient, 
impedes the growth of a mature sentencing jurisprudence that could provide 
guidance to national courts, where, because of the principle of 
complementarity and resource and other constraints, the bulk of future ICL 
prosecutions will be held. 
The expressive functions of punishment—its potential to indicate 
authoritative disavowal of criminal conduct, signify non-acquiescence in the 
crimes, vindicate international norms, and (perhaps) absolve ethnic or national 
communities, as collectives, of guilt by inculpating individuals—depend on 
 
237 Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 171. 
238 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
239 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 19, at 81. 
240 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akakeysu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentencing Judgment (Oct. 2, 
1998); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Sentencing Judgment (July 14, 1997). 
241 Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 92 (1999). 
242 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ¶ 562 (May 15, 2003). 
243 See Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14, ¶ 483 (May 16, 2003). 
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communication.244  Sentences issued only in writing, tacked on to dense, 
lengthy judicial decisions and unaccompanied by a public “ritual of manifest 
moral significance” that expresses the reprobative judgments of the relevant 
community, cannot fulfill these functions very effectively.  The application of 
ICL by international criminal tribunals will almost certainly remain in large 
measure a symbolic exercise.  Given resource and political constraints, the ad 
hoc tribunals, the ICC, and future international tribunals will never be able to 
function as a self-sufficient criminal justice system; they will never be able to 
try more than a fraction of the perpetrators.245  It is the symbolic value—not the 
number—of convictions that matters most to the goals that sentencing by these 
tribunals can realistically be expected to fulfill.  
Of course, given the gravity of most ICL crimes, juxtaposed against 
the constraints on the kind and degree of punishment imposed by international 
human rights law, one might reasonably question the ability of any sentence of 
incarceration to “duly express[] the outrage of the international community at 
[ICL] crimes.”246  In part, this problem is insoluble:  The normative goals of 
international human rights law impair the ability of punishment to accurately 
express the extraordinary global condemnation, anger, and retributive 
sentiments that these crimes elicit, particularly where the punitive norms of 
affected local communities would indicate a more severe penalty.  The 
expressive value of punishment may, however, be enhanced not only by 
substantive changes in the severity of punishment but by considering how 
more effectively to make the “process the punishment,”247 particularly for the 
elites on which the ICC intends to focus.  A sentencing hearing would enable 
experimentation in this regard. 
What would such a hearing involve?  In bare outline, both the defense 
and the prosecution should surely be given an opportunity to make formal 
submissions with relevant mitigating and aggravating circumstances, 
including, where appropriate, psychological and other expert testimony.248  
Furthermore, tribunals should consider adopting the familiar practice of having 
an independent official prepare a presentencing report, which would explore, 
as the Rome Statute instructs, “the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person.”249  Because of the collective nature of ICL crimes, and the often 
dramatically different normative universe in which the perpetrators act, 
developing a sentencing process and jurisprudence that distinguishes different 
categories of defendants based on their status, role, and background seems not 
only appropriate but essential to the legitimacy of the enterprise.250  And 
 
244 See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 101–05, 115. 
245 Wippman, supra note 161, at 480. 
246 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Judgment, ¶ 185 (Mar. 24, 2000); accord 
Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24, Judgment, ¶ 40 (July 31, 2003).   
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despite the bad press generated by the (until recently, mandatory) federal 
sentencing guidelines, the adoption of genuine sentencing guidelines by 
international tribunals would be a significant step toward rationalizing the 
sentencing process, particularly in cases of multiple convictions.251  Finally, a 
focus on the expressive value of punishment counsels public pronouncement of 
the sentence, perhaps even of the hearing itself, disseminated to as broad an 
audience as possible.252
The Rome Statute offers a unique opportunity to refocus attention on 
the significance of sentencing to the goals of ICL.  Like its predecessor 
instruments, it says little about sentencing.  But the positive-law framework 
created by the statute lends itself to a judicial interpretive process that could 
more effectively serve the expressive dimensions of punishment.  Article 77 
authorizes the Court to impose a specified term of imprisonment not to exceed 
thirty years except where a life sentence is “justified by the extreme gravity of 
the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”253  Article 
78 instructs the Court to determine sentences by taking “into account such 
factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person.”254  Rule 145 of the draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
however, goes beyond the minimal provisions of the ICTY and ICTR statutes, 
enumerating with greater specificity relevant aggravating and mitigating 
factors, including:  
 
the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature of 
the unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the 
crime; the degree of participation of the convicted person; the 
degree of intent; the circumstances of manner, time and 
location; and the age, education, social and economic condition 
of the convicted person.255  
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This emphasis on context, role, and circumstances is further reinforced 
by the inclusion, as one of two explicit mitigating factors, of “circumstances 
falling short of constituting grounds for exclusion of criminal responsibility, 
such as substantially diminished mental capacity or duress.”256  Together, these 
provisions offer a positive-law framework that can be construed to recognize 
the potential mitigating role of context and the collective nature of ICL crimes 
for rank-and-file perpetrators “who allowed themselves to be drawn into a 
maelstrom of violence, even reluctantly.”257  Rule 145(2)(b), conversely, can be 
construed to address those “who initiated or aggravated” the “maelstrom of 
violence,”258 an aggravating factor reflected in the sentencing jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc tribunals and now codified in the Rome Statute as “[a]buse of power 
or official capacity.”259  This construction also has the virtue of offering some 
guidance in interpreting Article 78’s authorization of life imprisonment “when 
justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances 
of the convicted person,”260 for Rule 145(3) speaks of the conditions for a life 
sentence being “evidenced by the existence of one or more aggravating 
circumstances.”261  
Most significantly, the Rome Statute, unlike its predecessors, 
presumptively “establishes the principle of a distinct sentencing phase.”262  This 
represents a significant innovation not only because of its capacity to enhance 
the expressive value of ICL, but also because, as in the national context, the 
“failure to hold a separate sentencing hearing may put the accused at a real 
disadvantage during the trial.”263  Of course, international criminal tribunals do 
not confront these issues in the constitutional context of the Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by jury.  But similar due process tensions exist:  A defendant may, 
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for example, wish to introduce evidence in mitigation but hesitate to relinquish 
the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination.264  The 
absence of a distinct sentencing stage in ICL may also threaten to compromise 
judicial neutrality, for evidence relevant only to sentencing—often of a highly 
inflammatory nature—must then be introduced at trial, where it may interfere 
with even the most professional judge’s ability to weigh the evidence relevant 
only to guilt or innocence dispassionately.265  The recent proliferation of guilty 
pleas before international tribunals makes a distinct sentencing phase all the 
more crucial.  
From a long-term perspective, a focus on the expressive capacity of 
punishment counsels greater attention to how law-abiding states and citizens, 
not only rogue states and the punished, perceive sentencing in international 
criminal law.  The adoption of the Rome Statute itself prompted a number of 
states “to incorporate prohibitions on genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity into their criminal statutes,” lest the ICC “find them ‘unable’ to 
prosecute international crimes.”266  ICC sentencing judgments, like the statute 
itself, hold a similar potential to influence the practice and policy of states by 
acting as an engine of jurisprudential and normative development where it 
matters the most, within nation-states.267
Any account of international sentencing must be realistic about its 
ability to achieve the ambitious and diverse goals ascribed to it.  But far from 
being “of secondary importance in the overall scheme of international 
justice,”268 as it has historically been treated, sentencing is as vital to the values 
and goals of ICL as adjudication.  As the ICC begins to investigate and 
prosecute its first cases, it should bear in mind that the Rome Statute’s explicit 
provision for sentencing hearings offers an opportunity to reinvigorate and 
jurisprudentially develop the law and process of ICL sentencing, an overdue 
imperative.  The beginnings of a “common law” of ICL sentencing, based on 
the judgments of the ad hoc tribunals and, to a lesser extent, hybrid and 
national courts applying ICL, provide a foundation on which to build.  
International criminal tribunals must develop coherent, fair, and principled 
sentencing practices, for their long-term success depends in part on the extent 
to which the social institution of punishment can be shaped to reflect, pursue, 
and in time, one hopes, justify their substantial costs.269
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